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Ruminations on the Louisiana Law of Pledge
Michael H. Rubin*
On January 1, 2015, Act 281 of the 2014 Louisiana legislative
session took effect.1 Drafted by the Louisiana State Law Institute,2
the Act amends, revises, and reworks not only the Civil Code
articles concerning the rules on pledge as a form of real security, but
also the articles setting forth the basic principles of personal liability
and security for loans. It also deals, in part, with judicial mortgages.
Practitioners will find that, although many basic pledge concepts
remain the same, there are a number of new rules, new procedures,
and, in some cases, new prohibitions.

Copyright 2015, by MICHAEL H. RUBIN.
* Mr. Rubin is a member of the multi-state firm of McGlinchey Stafford.
He has served as an Adjunct Professor at the Paul M. Hebert Law Center for
more than three decades and is a past president of the American College of Real
Estate Lawyers, the Bar Association of the United States Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals, and the Louisiana Bar Association. He is a Life Member of the
American Law Institute, a Commissioner on the Uniform Law Commission, and
was a member of the Louisiana State Law Institute Committee that proposed the
2014 revision to the pledge articles. His latest legal book is LOUISIANA
SECURITY DEVICES: A PRÉCIS (LexisNexis). His debut novel, published in the
Fall of 2014, is the legal thriller, THE COTTONCREST CURSE, published by the
LSU Press.
The author extends his thanks to L. David Cromwell, Christopher Odinet,
Dian Tooley-Knoblett, and Gabriel A. Crowson for their many helpful
comments and suggestions about this Article and the examples contained in it.
Their advice is sincerely appreciated, and any errors that remain are purely those
of the author.
1. Act No. 281, 2014 La. Acts. The Louisiana Law Review deviates from
The Bluebook for Louisiana source material when citing to session laws in the
Acts of the Louisiana Legislature. In addition to providing the year and page
number for the particular session law, the Louisiana Law Review also provides
the Act number. The Acts of the Louisiana Legislature can be found on
HeinOnline (under “Session Laws Library”) or in the Paul M. Hebert Law
Center Library.
2. The Louisiana State Law Institute was created by the Legislature in
1938 and serves as “an official advisory law revision commission, law reform
agency and legal research agency.” LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24:201 (2007). Note,
references to Louisiana Revised Statutes contained within are to the West
Louisiana Revised Statutes Annotated. The date appended to each statutory
reference is the publication date of each section. See also Act No. 166, 1938 La.
Acts 430. The Law Institute works not only on the “continuous revision,
clarification and co-ordination of the Louisiana Revised Statutes,” but also on
revisions to the Louisiana Civil Code. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24:251
(2007).
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I. THE BACKGROUND OF THE LOUISIANA LAW OF PLEDGE
There are numerous historical antecedents for the Louisiana
law of pledge, including an Egyptian tradition of pledging a
mummy to secure a loan,3 Greek4 and Roman5 law, and the Bible.6
Although there is an ongoing scholarly debate about whether
Louisiana owes more of its civilian tradition7 to France or Spain,8
there is no dispute that, at the time the entire Civil Code was
revised in 1870 following the Civil War,9 only 19 of its more than
3. See Valerie Seals Meiners, Comment, Formal Requirements Of Pledge
Under Louisiana Civil Code Article 3158 and Related Articles, 48 LA. L. REV.
129, 129 (1987).
4. See John H. Wigmore, The Pledge-Idea: A Study in Comparative Legal
Ideas, 10 HARV. L. REV. 321, 322–23 (1897). This article notes that
[I]n at least four important bodies of law and language the primitive
word for the ideas of “pledge,” “bet” (or “forfeit”), and “promise,” was
substantially the same. In the Scandinavian we have vaed, ved. In the
Germanic we have wetti, wette, wedde, vadi-um, guadi-um, and (by
sliding the di into ji) wage, guage, gage. In the Latin we have pignus in
the first two meanings, and from the same root (Πηγ́νυμι) pango, pag,
pactum, in the third meaning. In the Greek, the verb-stem øϵτ (put) has
all three meanings.
Id. (citations omitted). See also John H. Wigmore, The Pledge-Idea: A Study in
Comparative Legal Ideas. III, 11 HARV. L. REV. 18 (1897).
5. See Donald E. Phillipson, Development of the Roman Law of Debt
Security, 20 STAN. L. REV. 1230, 1237 (1968) (“Although pignus had apparently
arisen before the fifth century B.C., it was not included in the Twelve Tables.
Pignus was a form of security far less formal and restrictive than fiducia cum
creditore, because it did not involve a transfer of civil ownership.”); Cf. Shael
Herman, The Contribution of Roman Law to the Jurisprudence of Antebellum
Louisiana, 56 LA. L. REV. 257 (1995).
6. See, e.g., Genesis 38:18 (The Soncino Chumash) (“And he said, ‘What
pledge shall I give thee?’ And she said, ‘Thy signet, and thy bracelets, and thy
staff that is in thy hand.’”); Deuteronomy 24:6 (The Soncino Chumash) (“No
man shall take the mill or the upper millstone to pledge, for he taketh a man’s
life to pledge.”).
7. For a discussion of Louisiana’s civilian tradition, see Alvin B. Rubin,
Hazards of a Civilian Venturer in a Federal Court: Travel and Travail on the
Erie Railroad, 48 LA. L. REV. 1369 (1988).
8. See Vernon V. Palmer, The French Connection and the Spanish
Perception: Historical Debates and Contemporary Evaluation of French
Influence on Louisiana Civil Law, 63 LA. L. REV. 1067 (2003); see also Alain
Levasseur & Vicenç Feliú, The English Fox in the Louisiana Civil Law
Chausse-Trappe: Civil Law Concepts in the English Language; Comparativists
Beware!, 69 LA. L. REV. 715 (2009).
9. For an overview of the revisions to the Civil Code, see A.N.
Yiannopoulos, The Civil Codes of Louisiana, in LA. CIVIL CODE, at XLI (Vol. 1
2014). For a more detailed discussion of this issue, see A.N. Yiannopoulos, Two
Critical Years in the Life of the Louisiana Civil Code: 1870 and 1913, 53 LA. L.
REV. 5 (1992) [Yiannopoulos, Two Critical Years].
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40 articles on pledge were either direct translations of provisions of
the Code Napoléon or dealt with the same subject matter.10
Nonetheless, because the previous Louisiana Civil Code of 1825
was written in both French and English (with French being the
original language and English being the translation),11 and because
French law at the time influenced the redactors of the 1825 Civil
Code,12 many Louisiana courts have looked to the works of French
commentators to aid in understanding the pledge provisions.13
Once the 1870 Civil Code articles on pledge were enacted, they
remained almost completely unchanged until the 2014 legislative
session.14
10. See LA. STATE LAW INST., 3 LOUISIANA LEGAL ARCHIVES: COMPILED
EDITIONS OF THE CIVIL CODES OF LOUISIANA, pt. 2 (1942) (containing a wordfor-word comparison of the 1804 Code Napoleon, and the Louisiana Civil Codes
of 1808, 1825, and 1870). The following 1870 Civil Code articles are the subject
of Act 281 and are traceable directly back to the Code Napoleon: 3133–3135,
3141, 3157, 3160, 3162, 3164–3167, 3169, 3171, and 3176–3181.
11. Id.
12. See Yiannopoulos, The Civil Codes of Louisiana, supra note 9, at
XLVII, XLIX (“The redactors of the 1825 Code followed the French Civil Code
closely and relied heavily on French doctrine and jurisprudence. . . . The 1808
and 1825 Louisiana Civil Codes were drawn up in French and translated into
English. . . . [C]ourts taking cognizance of the fact that the French text was the
original version, and being aware of the poor quality of the [English] translation,
developed the view that the French text was controlling.”); see also
Yiannopoulos, Two Critical Years, supra note 9, at 22.
13. See, e.g., Scott v. Corkern, 91 So. 2d 569, 573 n.4 (La. 1956) (“The
reason for this rule is founded on the writings of the French commentators,
particularly Marcade, Troplong and Duranton who voice the opinion that it is
not the contract of pledge that interrupts prescription but the continuous
possession of the thing pledged with the debtor’s consent to such possession that
serves as a constant acknowledgment of the debt.” (citation omitted)); see also
Casey v. Cavaroc, 96 U.S. 467, 484 (1877); Citizens’ Bank v. Janin, 15 So. 471,
473 (La. 1894) (citing Troplong and Dalloz).
14. Of the 48 articles on pledge contained in the 1870 Civil Code (articles
3133–3181), 42 remained unchanged until the 2014 legislation. Two of the 1870
articles were repealed (articles 3160 and 3161). Four other articles were
amended between 1870 and 2014. The first is article 3133.1, amended by Act
No. 137, § 16, 1989 La. Acts 527, effective September 1, 1989, and Act No.
1079, §7, 1990 La. Acts 2735, effective September 1, 1990, to deal with
Louisiana’s adoption of Louisiana Revised Statutes section 10:9-101,
Louisiana’s version of UCC article 9. The second is article 3158, amended by
Act No. 157, § 1, 1900 La. Acts 239, Act No. 290, § 1, 1952 La. Acts 489, and
Act No. 137, § 17, 1989 La. Acts 527, which had the effect of reworking the
statute concerning the requirements of the pledge of movables and the effects of
pledge on third parties. Third, article 3159, amended by Act No. 157, §2, 1900
La. Acts 239 dealt with pledges in favor of banks and last, article 3165,
amended by Act No. 9, 1872 La. Acts 36, concerning the rights of a pledgee
upon the debtor’s default. See Ralph Slovenko, Of Pledge, 33 TUL. L. REV. 59
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When Louisiana adopted its version of UCC 9 in 1990,15 many
of the security interests that previously had been controlled by the
Civil Code pledge articles were superseded by the UCC provisions.
The 1870 Civil Code pledge articles remained in effect, however,
because there were some real security assets not covered by
Louisiana’s version of UCC 9.16
In the quarter of a century since Louisiana adopted UCC 9,
there has evolved a need to revisit the Civil Code pledge articles.
The Legislature enacted the Louisiana State Law Institute’s draft
proposal in its entirety,17 and the current revision to the pledge
articles completely rewrites this section of the Civil Code.
Some of the changes made by the 2014 legislation alter prior
law and introduce new concepts. For example, Act 281 of 2014
allows non-recourse loans secured by a pledge.18 It abolishes

(1959) (discussing the pledge rules adopted in 1870 and the jurisprudence that
developed in the more than sixty years that followed).
15. Although technically the proper terminology should be “Chapter 9 of
the Uniform Commercial Code, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 10:9-101 et seq.,” for ease
of reference this article will use the phrase “UCC 9.”
16. For simplicity, this Rumination refers to the Louisiana Civil Code in a
modified fashion, to highlight the differences between the old and new
provisions, which became effective January 1, 2015. The term “Old C.C. art.
(2013) (repealed 2014)” will be used to refer to those Civil Code provisions
impacted by Act 281 as they existed prior to January 1, 2015, the effective date
of Act 281. The term “New C.C. art. (2015)” will be used to refer to the Civil
Code provisions as amended by Act 281. See Old C.C. art. 3133.1 (2013)
(repealed 2014) (amended by Act No. 137, 1989 La. Acts 527 & Act No. 1079,
1990 La. Acts 2811).
This Title shall apply to pledges of movables that are delivered prior to
the time Chapter 9 of the Louisiana Commercial Laws becomes
effective, including without limitation those pledges that may secure
future obligations and lines of credit, as well as to pledges entered into
on or after the time Chapter 9 of the Louisiana Commercial Laws
becomes effective that are exempt or otherwise excluded from coverage
thereunder.
Old C.C. art. 3133.1 (2013) (repealed 2014). See also LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
10:9-109(d) (2002) (detailing the types of transactions that are outside the scope
of Louisiana’s version of UCC 9).
17. L. David Cromwell served as Reporter for the Law Institute’s Security
Devices Committee and Claire Popovich was the staff attorney. Members of the
Committee included: James R. Austin, David J. Boneno, Elizabeth R. Carter,
Scott P. Gallinghouse, David W. Gruning, Thomas A. Harrell, Kelly G. Juneau,
Peter L. Koerber, Marilyn C. Maloney, Max Nathan, Jr., Christopher Odinet,
Ronald J. Scalise, Jr., Emmett C. Sole, James A. Stuckey, Adam J. Swensek,
Susan G. Talley, George J. Tate, Robert P. Thibeaux, Dian Tooley-Knoblett,
Keith Vetter, and Michael H. Rubin.
18. See New C.C. art. 3135 (2015).
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antichresis, which is the pledge of immovable property.19 It alters
the rules on how a creditor can obtain a secured position in a
landlord’s lease or rents as well as the rules regulating the rights of
landlord, creditor, and tenant, and it moves these rules from the
Revised Statutes to the Civil Code.20 It affirms the enforceability
of a “negative pledge” but prohibits a payment obligor from
restricting the right of the payment obligee to encumber the
payment stream.21
For the remainder of this Rumination, the term “Old C.C. art.”
will be used to refer to those Civil Code provisions impacted by Act
281 as they existed prior to January 1, 2015, the effective date of
Act 281. The term “New C.C. art.” will be used to refer to the Civil
Code provisions as amended by Act 281.22
II. THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF PERSONAL LIABILITY, PERSONAL
SECURITY, AND REAL SECURITY
Act 281 did more than amend and change the Civil Code’s pledge
provisions. It also reworked articles that had been in the “privileges”
section of the Civil Code setting forth the general principles of
personal liability, personal security, and real security.23
A. An Obligor’s Personal Liability and Creditor Remedies
Old C.C. arts. 3182 and 3183 have long been considered the
starting point for any analysis of security interests. Old C.C. art.
3182 declared that once one had bound “himself personally,” his
personal obligation was to be satisfied out of all of his “property,
movable and immovable, present and future.”24 New C.C. art. 3133
adopts the same rule, and the Comments to the article note that this
general provision is subject to state statutory and state
constitutional exemptions from seizure.
Old C.C. art. 3183 declared that the property of a debtor “is the
common pledge of his creditors and the proceeds of its sale must
be distributed among them ratably, unless there exist among the
creditors some lawful causes of preference.”25 When the Civil
Code was revised in 1870 following the Civil War, the only lawful
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

See Old C.C. arts. 3176–3181 (2013) (repealed 2014).
See infra Part IX.
See infra Part VII.
See supra note 16.
Act No. 281, 2014 La. Acts.
See Old C.C. art. 3182 (2013) (repealed 2014).
See Old C.C. art. 3183 (2013) (repealed 2014).
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causes of preference were privileges and mortgages.26 New C.C.
art. 3134 employs the same general concept as Old C.C. art. 3183
but notes that the ratable sale rule is subject to “a preference
authorized or established by legislation.”27
The Comments to new C.C. art. 3134 point out that not all of
an obligor’s creditors are entitled to an “immediate right to share in
the proceeds of each sale of the obligor’s property,” noting, for
example, that in a voluntary sale, the obligor retains the proceeds,
but these then form part of the obligor’s patrimony that creditors
can pursue.
B. Contractual Limitations on What Property a Creditor May Seize
Louisiana law creates constitutional and statutory exemptions
from seizure and sale,28 but nothing in Louisiana law has
prohibited parties from contracting for additional limitations.
Further, since 1992 the Civil Code has permitted non-recourse
mortgages—mortgages in which the obligor has no personal
liability on the principal obligation that the mortgage secures and
where the creditor’s only right to collect funds is through a seizure
and sale of the mortgaged property.29
Until Act 281 was adopted, the Civil Code had never expressly
dealt with the converse of this rule—the possibility of a personal
obligation where the creditor agrees to limit recovery to only
“particular property or to a specified class of property.”30 New
C.C. art. 3135 expressly authorizes this type of contractual
provision.31
26. See Old C.C. art. 3184 (2013) (repealed 2014).
27. See New C.C. art. 3134 (2015).
28. See, e.g., LA. CONST. art. 12, § 9 (1970); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:3881
(2006).
29. Old C.C. art. 3297 (2013) (repealed 2014) (amended by Act No. 652,
1991 La. Acts 302). Prior to the adoption of this article, debtors and creditors
often created a non-recourse mortgage contractually. They would put a clause in
the mortgage requiring the creditor, prior to suing the debtor personally, to
foreclose on the mortgage by executory process without appraisal. Once a
foreclosure without appraisal occurred, the Louisiana Deficiency Judgment Act
prohibited the creditor from pursuing the debtor personally if the proceeds of the
sale were not sufficient to satisfy the obligation. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§
13:4106–4108.3 (2006). Thus, the parties were able to contractually create a
mortgage package where the debtor effectively had no personal liability on the
principal obligation secured by the mortgage.
30. New C.C. art. 3135 (2015).
31. In Shell Offshore, Inc. v. M.H. Marr, 916 F.2d 1040 (5th Cir. 1990), the
Fifth Circuit reversed “the district court’s determination that a provision in the
subject agreement to the effect that Marr’s indebtedness to Shell ‘shall be paid’
from a share of Marr’s working interest in certain gas wells constitutes an
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The language of New C.C. art. 3135 appears to permit contract
provisions to trump a creditor’s right to obtain a judicial mortgage32
on all of a debtor’s current and future property following a judgment
and to obtain a writ of fieri facias33 on all of the judgment-debtor’s
non-exempt property. Under New C.C. art. 3135, a debtor may have
a basis to assert that, despite having lost a lawsuit concerning a debt
and despite the creditor having obtained a judicial mortgage
through the proper procedures,34 the specific provisions of a
creditor’s contract with the judgment debtor prohibit the creditor
from exercising the judicial mortgage on immovable property
described in the contract or from obtaining a writ of fieri facias on
other assets described in the contract.
It is anticipated that jurisprudence will develop on the
interpretation of the contractual limitations permitted by New C.C.
art. 3135.
C. What Is “Security”
Although the UCC uses the term “security interest,”35 and
although courses in Louisiana law schools that teach privileges,
pledge, suretyship, and mortgage are called “Security Devices,” the
term “security” had not been defined in the Civil Code until the
2014 amendments.
New C.C. art. 3136 defines security as “an accessory right
established by legislation or contract” as well as “an obligation
undertaken by a person other than the principal obligor.”36 Thus,
the definition includes privileges as well as such concepts as
pledge, mortgage, and suretyship, but the list given is only
illustrative.37 The amendments, however, state that a Civil Code

exclusive method for extinguishing the balance of that debt.” Id. at 1041. To the
extent that Shell Offshore might be seen as granting credence to an assertion that
one cannot limit recovery to certain assets absent a security interest in those
assets, it appears that the 2014 amendment to article 3135 overrules this
contention.
32. A judicial mortgage arises by operation of law from a judgment
recorded in the parish mortgage records. See C.C. art. 3300 (2015). It is a
general mortgage over all of the judgment debtor’s current and future owned
immovable property in that parish. C.C. arts. 3302–3303 (2015).
33. Writs of fieri facias are dealt with in Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure
articles 2292–2299. See LA. CODE CIV. PROC. arts. 2292–2299 (2015).
34. See C.C. arts. 3285, 3299–3306 (2015). For more discussion on judicial
mortgages, see infra Part X.
35. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10:1-201(35) (2003).
36. See New C.C. art. 3136 (2015).
37. New C.C. art. 3138, Comment (c), provides:

704

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75

“security” is not the same as a UCC security interest.38 To help
avoid problems in the future, and because “it remains a common
practice”39 for UCC 9 security interests to be “styled as a
‘pledge,’”40 the 2014 amendments make it clear that calling a UCC
9 security interest a “pledge” does not subject it to the provisions
of the Civil Code pledge articles, but nonetheless the document
“may be effective to create a [UCC 9] security interest in the
thing.”41
New C.C. art. 3137 defines personal and real security. The
quintessential personal security is suretyship.42 The specific rules
concerning the “real security” of pledge, mortgage, and privilege
are governed by the appropriate sections and articles of the Civil
Code and Revised Statutes.

The list contained in this Article is merely illustrative. Other forms of
security exist, such as a pignorative contract in the form of a sale with a
right of redemption in favor of a seller who remains in possession.
New C.C. art. 3138 (2015) (citations omitted).
38. See New C.C. art. 3139 (2015).
39. New C.C. art. 3143 cmt. (2015). For example, since its effective date in
1990, UCC 9 has governed the perfection of a security interest in a collateral
mortgage note. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:9-310(b)(6), 10:9-313(a) (Supp.
2015); see also id. § 9:5551 (2007). Despite the fact that the old Civil Code
pledge articles do not control post-1990 “pledges” of collateral mortgage notes,
some courts continue to cite the old pledge articles, apparently assuming that
they still apply to post-1990 collateral mortgage notes. See Old C.C. art. 3133.1
(2013) (repealed 2014); see also supra note 16 (quoting old article 3133.1); see,
e.g., CadleRock Joint Ventures Co. v. J. Graves Scaffolding Co., 152 So. 3d
1079 (La. Ct. App. 2014).
40. New C.C. art. 3143 cmt. (2015).
41. Id. Note that the bracketed “UCC 9” does not appear in the text of New
C.C. art. 3143 because New C.C. art. 3139 makes it clear that the term “security
interest” refers to UCC 9. Nonetheless, the bracketed language has been added
in the text above for emphasis.
42. The Comments to revised article 3137 note that this article “is new but it
is not intended to change the law.” See New C.C. art. 3137 cmt. a (2015) (citing
Slovenko, supra note 14). For more on suretyship, see Michael H. Rubin,
Ruminations on Suretyship, 57 LA. L. REV. 565 (1997); MICHAEL H. RUBIN,
LOUISIANA SECURITY DEVICES, A PRÉCIS, ch. 2–8 (LexisNexis 2011)
[hereinafter RUBIN, A PRÉCIS]. It is possible that Louisiana law may contain
personal security other than suretyship. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4802
cmt. b (Supp. 2015) (located in the Louisiana Private Works Act). Section
9:4802 cmt. b states:
Although the personal liability imposed upon the owner and the
personal liability imposed upon the contractor are not those of sureties
the claims are clearly obligations of security and are accessory to the
primary contractual obligations of the claimants.
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D. No Ownership by the Creditor upon Default
New C.C. art. 3140 enshrines “a longstanding civilian
concept”43 prohibiting contracts that permit a creditor to become
the owner of the real security upon the debtor’s default. This rule,
which has existed “since the edict of Constantine,”44 is designed to
prevent creditors from inserting this clause into every contract,
thereby allowing a creditor to get a windfall if the value of the real
security far exceeds the debt, either at the time the debt is incurred
or at the time a default occurs.
Although New C.C. art. 3140 prohibits such pre-default
agreements, nothing prevents a creditor and debtor, after default,
from entering into a contract by which the debtor transfers an asset,
including real security, to pay off all or a portion of a debt. This type
of post-default contract is permitted both by the Civil Code’s
“giving in payment” provisions45 as well as by the Deficiency
Judgment Act.46
43. See New C.C. art. 3140 cmt. a (2015).
44. Alcolea v. Smith, 90 So. 769, 771 (1922). The quotation from the case
is powerful and is worth reiterating in full:
Since the edict of Constantine annulling and prohibiting what was
known as the lex commissoria and the stipulation in the contract of
pledge which it authorized, whereby, in default of payment by the
pledgor, the thing pledged became the property of the pledgee without
further action on his part, such stipulations have been prohibited in all
countries where the civil law prevails, and the prohibition has long
since become part of the common law, the commentators on both
systems agreeing that they are contra bonos mores and oppressive; that
they involve the abuse of the power of the strong over the weak,
represent odious speculations by those who have money, at the expense
of those who need it, and are unconscionable.
Id. at 771 (citations omitted).
45. See Old C.C. arts. 2655–2659 (2013) (repealed 2014) (amended by Act
No. 841, § 1, 1933 La. Acts 1037). This concept is often referred to in Louisiana
as a dation en paiement. See, e.g., Succession of Dupre, 51 So. 2d 317, 318 (La.
1950) (“A giving in payment or dation en paiement is an act by which a debitor
gives a thing to a creditor, who is willing to receive it, in payment of a sum
which is due.”); Farmers-Merchants Bank & Trust Co. v. CIT Group/Equipment
Fin., Inc., 888 F.2d 1524 (5th Cir. 1989).
46. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:4108.1–13:4108.3 (2006). For example,
Louisiana Revised Statutes section 13:4108.1(A) provides:
As an exception to R.S. 13:4106 and 4107, if a mortgagee or other
creditor holds a mortgage, pledge, security interest, or privilege which
secures an obligation in a commercial transaction, the mortgagee or
other creditor may collect from or pursue any debtor, guarantor, or
surety for a deficiency judgment on the secured obligation whether or
not the mortgagee or other creditor has foreclosed on all or any of the
property and sold such property at a judicial, public, or private sale,
with or without appraisal, regardless of the minimum bid, and whether
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III. THE LIMITED SCOPE OF ASSETS THAT CAN BE PLEDGED
Prior to 1990, the Civil Code pledge provisions were extremely
broad and applied to “every corporeal thing, which is susceptible
of alienation,”47 items classified as “incorporeal movables,”48 and
“a claim on another person.”49 With the advent of Louisiana’s
adoption of UCC 9 in 1990, however, creditors who wanted to
secure loans with the vast majority of items that formerly could be
pledged had to employ the UCC’s rules and procedures.50
The changes made by Act 281 of 2014 include an exclusive
listing of assets subject to pledge. Under New C.C. art. 3142, the
“only things” that can be pledged are movables “not susceptible of
encumbrance by security interest,” a “lessor’s rights in the lease of
an immovable and its rents,”51 and “things made susceptible of
pledge by law.”
Among the things “made susceptible of pledge by law” are
property insurance on immovables52 and certain mineral payments.53
A. A Pledge of Property Insurance on Immovables
The 2014 amendments changed portions of the Civil Code
Ancillaries54 to make it clear that a pledge is the proper mechanism

or not the mortgagee or other creditor has acquired such property from
any debtor, guarantor, or surety pursuant to a complete or partial giving
in payment. However, other than with regard to a secured transaction
subject to Chapter 9 of the Louisiana Commercial Laws, a mortgagee
or other creditor may not pursue any debtor, guarantor, or surety for
more than the secured obligation, minus the reasonably equivalent
value of the property sold.
Id. § 13:4801.1 (2006) (emphasis added).
47. Old C.C. art. 3154 (2013) (repealed 2014).
48. Old C.C. art. 3155 (2013) (repealed 2014).
49. Old C.C. art. 3156 (2013) (repealed 2014).
50. Old C.C. art. 3133.1 (2013) (repealed 2014); see supra note 16 (quoting
old article 3133.1 in full).
51. See infra Part IX (concerning a lessor’s encumbering the rental income
stream of immovable property).
52. See infra Part III.A.
53. See infra Part III.B.
54. See Gen. Elec. Capital Corp. v. Se. Health Care, 950 F.2d 944, 952–53
(5th Cir. 1991) (“Title 9 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes of 1950 contains the
so-called Civil Code Ancillaries, particular statutes that supplement the Code.”);
see also Guillory Real Estate, Inc. v. Ward, 296 So. 2d 853, 858 (La. Ct. App.
1974) (“[T]he whole of Revised Statutes Title 9 which are known as the Civil
Code Ancilliaries [sic], and are auxilliary [sic] to the Civil Code.”). When the
Louisiana State Law Institute drafted the bill that became Louisiana Revised
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to grant a mortgage creditor a real security right in insurance on
immovable property.55 Thus, property insurance is one of the
assets New C.C. art. 3142 makes “susceptible of pledge by law.”
B. A Pledge of Mineral Payments by an Owner of Land or a
Holder of a Mineral Servitude
New C.C. art. 3172 clarifies the law on how to encumber
mineral lease bonus payments payable to a landowner or holder of a
mineral servitude. This article specifies the only kind of mineral
payments susceptible of pledge. These are pledges by “the owner of
land or holder of a mineral servitude” on “bonuses, delay rentals,
royalties, and shut-in payments arising from mineral leases, as well
as other payments that are classified as rent under the Mineral
Code.”56
The contract of pledge must specifically describe the mineral
interests being pledged. As the Comments to this article note, a
“mere statement that all leases and rents of the immovable are
pledged will not suffice for the pledge to encumber mineral
payments.”57
Note that New C.C. art. 3172 does not apply to mineral
payments owing to those who are neither a landowner nor a holder
of a mineral servitude.58
IV. THE ACCESSORY NATURE OF PLEDGE
It has been a basic civil law principle that security is an
accessory obligation.59 There must always be a principal obligation,
even if that principal obligation is non-recourse.60

Statutes section 9, it anticipated that these provisions would be called the
“ancillaries.” See Harriet Daggett, 1950 Comments, reprinted in 2B WEST’S
LSA REVISED STATUTES 3 (West):
As indicated by the word Ancillaries, Title 9 of the Revised Statutes of
1950 is auxiliary to the Civil Code of Louisiana. All of the sections are
correlated with the books and titles of the Code and hence are very
easily followed in pursuing a problem basically dependent upon the
articles of the Code. . . .
55. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:5386 (2007).
56. The Louisiana Mineral Code is Louisiana Revised Statutes sections
31:1–31:217.
57. New C.C. art. 3172 cmt. b (2015).
58. See New C.C. art. 3172 cmt. f (2015) (“Mineral payments owing to a
person other than a landowner or holder of a mineral servitude are not
susceptible of pledge under this Title.”).
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Unlike the laws of some states,61 in Louisiana the accessory
obligation is not severable from the principal obligation. If the
principal obligation becomes unenforceable, the accessory obligation
is likewise unenforceable unless novation is involved.62 The converse,
however, is not true. The extinguishment of an accessory obligation
does not necessarily impact the enforceability of the principal
obligation.63
The principal obligation that a pledge secures may be for the
performance of an act,64 for a debt of the pledgor, or for the debt of
another.65 When the debt of a third party is secured by a pledge,
the 2014 amendments to New C.C. art. 3148 adopt a rule
applicable to suretyship66 and similar to a rule applicable to

59. The 2014 version of article 3136 described pledge as an “auxiliary
obligation.” Article 3278 states that mortgages “secure the performance of an
obligation,” and article 3282 states that “mortgage is accessory to the obligation
it secures.” C.C. arts. 3278, 3282 (2015). See, e.g., Chapman v. Citizens’ Bank
of La., 31 La. Ann. 395, 396 (1879):
The mortgage, whether conventional or judicial, is but an accessory
right, which can not [sic] exist without the principal right or obligation
which it secures; and it is elementary in our law that the mortgage falls
with the principal obligation to which it is accessory.
60. See supra note 29 (discussing non-recourse loans); Old C.C. art. 3135
(2013) (repealed 2014).
61. See, e.g., Wiley v. Deutsch Bank Nat’l Trust Co., 539 F. App’x 533, 536
(5th Cir. 2013) (citations omitted).
Texas courts have explained on multiple occasions that a note and a
deed of trust constitute separate actions. “It is so well settled as not to
be controverted that the right to recover a personal judgment for a debt
secured by a lien on land and the right to have a foreclosure of lien are
severable, and a plaintiff may elect to seek a personal judgment without
foreclosing the lien, and even without a waiver of the lien.” Where a
debt is “secured by a note, which is, in turn, secured by a lien, the note
and lien constitute separate obligations.” The duality of the lien and the
note means that the beneficiary of the lien can be different from the
holder of the note.
62. See, e.g., Tex. Bank of Beaumont v. Bozorg, 457 So. 2d 667, 671 n.4
(La. 1984) (“Pledge is an accessory contract . . . .”); Auguste v. Renard, 3 Rob.
389, 390 (La. 1843) (“It is clear that a mortgage can exist only as an accessory
to a principal obligation . . . .”). There are special rules on novation. Security for
a novated obligation, “with the agreement of the parties,” may be transferred to
a new obligation. See C.C. art. 1884 (2015).
63. Under Louisiana Civil Code article 1891, release of real security “does
not give rise to a presumption of remission of debt.” There are special rules,
however, for remission involving sureties. See C.C. art. 1892 (2015); see also
Rubin, supra note 42, at 583–86; RUBIN, A PRÉCIS, supra note 42, at 45–47.
64. See New C.C. art. 3147 (2015).
65. See New C.C. art. 3148 (2015).
66. See C.C. art. 3046 (2015) (entitled “Defenses available to surety”).
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mortgages.67 Under New C.C. art. 3148, the pledgor “may assert
against the pledgee any defense that the obligor could assert except
lack of capacity or discharge in bankruptcy of the obligor”68 or any
“other defenses available to a surety.”69
V. MAKING A PLEDGE EFFECTIVE BETWEEN THE PARTIES
AND AS TO THIRD PARTIES
The 2014 amendments made several important changes in the
procedure by which pledges become effective between the parties
and affect third parties.
A. The Pledge of Corporeal Movables
In contrast to the lengthy provisions of Old C.C. art. 3158,70
there are now but three simple rules for the pledge of corporeal
movables.
First, all that is needed for a pledge of corporeal movables to
be effective between the parties is the pledgor’s delivery of the
object to either the pledgee or to “a third person who has agreed to
hold the thing for the benefit of the pledgee.”71 Although no
written agreement is required between the parties in such
instances,72 there may need to be some type of agreement that the
purpose of delivery is a pledge to secure a principal obligation, for
there are other contracts that arise in connection with a delivery of
corporeal movables from an owner to another, including loan for
use,73 loan for consumption,74 and deposit.75
67. See C.C. art. 3295 (2015) (entitled “Mortgage securing another’s
obligation”); C.C. art. 3296 (2015) (entitled “Right of mortgagor to raise
defenses”).”
68. New C.C. art. 3148 (2015).
69. Id.
70. Old C.C. art. 3158 (2013) (repealed 2014) (amended by Act No. 157,
§1, 1900 La. Acts 239–40; Act No. 290, §1, 1952 La. Acts 748–50; Act No.
137, 1989 La. Acts 527, 589–92). This article, as amended through 1989,
consisted of 985 words with six parts and ten subparts.
71. New C.C. art. 3149 (2015).
72. Note, however, that as Comment (e) to revised article 3149 cautions, if
delivery of the corporeal movable is to someone other than either the pledgee or
“a third person who has agreed to hold the thing for the benefit of the pledgee,”
then even as between the parties a written agreement is required to make
effective the pledge of the corporeal movable. For example, apparently a written
agreement would be required even as between the parties if the delivery of the
corporeal movable was to someone other than the pledgee who, at the time of
the delivery, had not yet agreed to “hold the thing for the benefit of the
pledgee.” New C.C. art. 3149 cmt. e (2015).
73. See C.C. arts. 2891–2903 (2015).
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Second, making the pledge of corporeal movables effective to
third parties requires a written contract in addition to the delivery
requirement.76 There is no requirement that the written contract be
notarized, witnessed, or recorded in any public record.
Third, only the pledgee need sign the written contract. The
pledgor’s acceptance “is presumed”77 and “may be tacit.”78
The apparent simplicity of the rules involving corporeal
movables masks a deeper issue. As the Comments to New C.C. art.
3149 note, “there may actually be no corporeal movables to which
[this] rule would presently apply, for Chapter 9 of the Uniform
Commercial Code may cover all corporeal movables without
exception.”79 As explained by the Comment this provision “is not
intended to apply to a corporeal movable that is susceptible of
encumbrance” under UCC 9. Therefore, the rules concerning
corporeal movables only apply to those that now or in the future
may be outside the scope of UCC 9.80
B. The Pledge of Things that Are Not Corporeal Movables and Do
Not Involve a Landlord’s Right in a Lease or Rental Income
Under the 2014 revisions, a written instrument is the only way
to pledge items that are not corporeal movables81 and that do not
involve a landlord’s rights in a lease or rental income arising from
immovable property.82 The written instrument is required to make
such a pledge effective both between the parties83 and to third
parties.84 No delivery is required, and the former distinction
between “incorporeals evidenced in writing” and “incorporeals not
evidenced in writing” has not been applicable since July 1, 2001.85

74. See C.C. arts. 2904–2912 (2015).
75. See C.C. arts. 2926–2940 (2015).
76. See New C.C. art. 3153 (2015).
77. New C.C. art. 3150 (2015).
78. Id.
79. New C.C. art. 3149 cmt. c (2015).
80. Id.
81. New C.C. art. 3149 (2015).
82. The special rules concerning landlords are located in Chapter 2 of the
Pledge provisions. See generally New C.C. arts. 3168–3175 (2015).
83. New C.C. art. 3149 (2015).
84. See New C.C. art. 3153 (2015).
85. See Paul M. Hebert & Carlos E. Lazarus, Louisiana Legislation of 1938,
1 LA. L. REV. 80, 108–10 (1938) (discussing the meaning and distinction
between incorporeals that are “evidenced in writing” and those that are not). The
statutes that previously dealt with these concepts were Louisiana Revised
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Like the rules applicable to those written instruments required
for the pledge of corporeal movables, only the pledgor’s signature is
required on the written instrument concerning the pledge of things
that are not corporeal movables.86 Unlike the pledge of corporeal
movables, however, recordation of the written instrument may be
required if the pledge involves a lease of immovable property,87 the
rents from such property,88 or certain mineral interests or rights.89
If what has been pledged is not a lessee’s obligation to pay rent
but rather some other obligation outside the scope of UCC 9, then
the pledge “is effective against third persons only from the time that
the obligor has actual knowledge of the pledge or has been given
notice of it.”90 Because pledge is a form of real security,91 and
because it is important to ascertain the ranking order among
creditors who may have a preference to the proceeds of a sale of
real security, creditors may want to consider giving notice to thirdparty obligors to assure the earliest possible date of the
effectiveness of the pledge “against third persons” under New C.C.
art. 3155.
Moreover, notice to the third-party obligor is important because,
until notice is given in writing directing the third-party obligor to
make payments to the pledgee,92 the third-party obligor may
continue to make payments to the pledgor. If the third-party obligor
“renders performance”93 that “extinguishes the pledged obligation”94
before receiving written notice to render performance to the pledgee,
then the pledgee has no right to demand anything of the third-party
obligor.
New C.C. art. 3162 sets forth defenses that the third-party
obligor may assert. Absent an agreement to the contrary by the
third-party obligor,95 those defenses include “any defense arising
out of the transaction that gave rise to the pledged obligation” as

Statutes sections 9:4321–9:4323, repealed by Act No. 128, §18, 2001 La. Acts
206, 378, effective July 1, 2001.
86. The pledgee’s acceptance is presumed. New C.C. art. 3150 (2015).
87. See infra Part IX.
88. Id.
89. See supra Part III.B.
90. New C.C. art. 3155 (2015).
91. New C.C. arts. 3137–3138 (2015).
92. New C.C. art. 3161 (2015).
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. New C.C. art. 3162 (2015).
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well as “any other defense that arises against the pledgor before the
obligor has been given written notice of the pledge.”96
C. Pledging Items Not Owned
New C.C. art. 3152 continues the concept contained in Old
C.C. art. 3144 and akin to the after-acquired-title doctrine.97 Even
if a pledgor does not presently own an asset, a pledge is
“established when the thing is acquired by the pledgor and the
other requirements for the establishment of the pledge have been
satisfied.”98
VI. RIGHTS OF THE PLEDGEE
A pledgee has a number of rights, including the right of
retention as against the pledgor, the right to collect fruits, and
either the right to exercise a privilege on the proceeds of the sale of
the pledged item (if the item can be sold) or the right to
performance (if the pledged item consists of performance by a
third person).
A. The Right of Retention
Because a “contract of pledge is indivisible, notwithstanding
the divisibility of the secured obligations,”99 a pledgee may refuse
to return the pledged item to the pledgor until the extinguishment
of the entirety of the obligations that the pledge secures.100
Therefore, if a pledgor pledges three corporeal movables (not
covered by UCC 9), each worth $100, to secure a $300 debt, the
pledgor may not pay $200 to the pledgee and demand return of two
of the three items.101 The creditor may retain possession of all the
pledged items until the entire debt is completely extinguished. Of
course, the pledgor and pledgee may contractually agree
otherwise,102 but absent such an agreement, the pledgor’s remedy
to regain the pledged items is to pay off the debt.
96. Id.
97. For a discussion of the after-acquired-title doctrine, see Lyons v. Fisher,
847 F.2d 1158 (5th Cir. 1988).
98. New C.C. art. 3152 (2015).
99. New C.C. art. 3157 (2015).
100. New C.C. arts. 3156–3157 (2015).
101. New C.C. art. 3157 (2015).
102. A similar type of contractual agreement exists in the mortgage arena.
When a subdivision is developed, a construction mortgage in favor of a lender is
usually placed on the entire tract. Because mortgages, like pledges, are indivisible,
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It should be noted that the pledgee’s right of retention is only
against the pledgor. As Comment (b) to New C.C. art. 3156 states,
this article “does not alter the longstanding rule that a pledgee may
not resist seizure under judicial process, even if instituted by a
creditor holding an inferior security right.” If judicial seizure
occurs, the remedy for the pledgee is to intervene in the lawsuit
and assert its real security rights.103
B. The Pledgee’s Rights to Collect Fruits
New C.C. art. 3159 permits a pledgee to “receive the fruits of
the thing pledged,” to retain the fruits as security, and to “apply
them to the secured obligation, even if not yet due.” New C.C. art.
3159 is a one-sentence “simplification”104 of the pledgee’s right to
collect fruits, “a common feature of the law of pledge in civilian
jurisdictions.”105
The Comments to New C.C. art. 3159 note that it is based on
Old C.C. art. 3168. A brief discussion of the historical importance
of the pledgee’s right to collect fruits may help in understanding
the evolution of the rule.
After the Civil War, when the Civil Code was completely
revised in 1870, there were two ways to grant a security interest on
immovables. The first was a mortgage—a non-possessory right
that gave the creditor only the option of seizing and selling the
property upon default.106 Under the mortgage articles, there was no
way for a creditor to have any rights to crops (“fruits”) or rents
(“civil fruits”)107 prior to default. The concept of a “crop pledge”

the developer cannot unilaterally demand that the lender release the mortgage on
each lot as it is sold. See C.C. art. 3280 (2015). Therefore, a developer and its
lender typically enter into a contract stipulating a release price on each lot. As the
lot is sold, the lender executes an act of partial release pursuant to the contractual
provision. See, e.g., Schexnayder v. Capital Riverside Acres, 129 So. 139 (La.
1930) (involving a partial release clause in a mortgage).
103. See LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 1092 (2015) (discussing the procedural
rules of intervention).
104. New C.C. art. 3159 cmt. (2015).
105. Id.
106. Louisiana Civil Code article 3278 (1870) provided: “Mortgage is a right
granted to the creditor over the property of the debtor for the security of his debt,
and gives him the power of having the property seized and sold in default of
payment.” That concept was carried forward in current Louisiana Civil Code
articles 3278 and 3279, amended by Act No. 652, 1991 La. Acts 2068, 2081–97.
107. Louisiana Civil Code article 551 provides in pertinent part: “Civil fruits
are revenues derived from a thing by operation of law or by reason of a juridical
act, such as rentals, interest, and certain corporate distributions.” See C.C. art.
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did not arise until 1874,108 four years after the enactment of the
1870 Civil Code.109
In addition to mortgage, however, the Civil Code drafters
allowed creditors to obtain a real security right to collect crops and
rents through antichresis, a concept that appears in the Code
Napoléon.110 Under Louisiana law, a creditor could hold a mortgage,
an antichresis, or both.111 Because immovable property is capable of
generating crops and rents, the antichresis articles specifically allowed
the creditor to use “fruits” as they came due, to apply them to both
principal and interest as they came due,112 as well as to use the
“fruits” to pay taxes and make repairs on the property.113
551 (2015) (emphasis added) (amended by Act No. 103, 1976 La. Acts 321–
430); see also Cooper v. Cappel, 29 La. Ann. 213 (1877) (stating that “rents are
civil fruits”).
108. The crop pledge act was originally enacted by Act No. 66, 1874 La.
Acts 114–15.
109. For a detailed discussion of the Louisiana crop pledge, see L. David
Cromwell, Secured Interests in Louisiana Crops: The 2010 Legislative Revision,
71 LA. L. REV. 1176, 1180 (2011).
110. See Joseph Dainow, 1972 Compiled Edition of the Civil Codes of
Louisiana, in 16–17 WEST’S LA. STAT. ANN. (West 1973) (demonstrating that
all of the antichresis articles had direct parallels to the Code Napoleon).
111. The old version Louisiana Civil Code article 3181 provided:
Every provision, which is contained in the present title with respect to
the antichresis, can not [sic] prejudice the rights which third persons
may have on the immovable, given in pledge by way of antichresis,
such as a privilege or mortgage. The creditor, who is in possession by
way of antichresis can not [sic] have any right of preference on the
other creditors; but if he has by any other title, some privilege or
mortgage lawfully established or preserved thereon, he will come in his
rank as any other creditor.
Old C.C. art. 3181 (2013) (repealed 2014) (emphasis added). See also
Pickersgill v. Brown, 7 La. Ann. 297, 314 (1852):
A mortgage in favor of one creditor, not put into action by fieri facias
or writ of seizure, may coexist with an antichresis in favor of another
creditor. The antichresis operates upon the fruits, which the creditor,
holding it, is thereby authorized, by his debtor, to gather. A mortgage
affects the land. If the holder of the antichresis gathers the fruits before
the mortgage creditor seizes, he can apply them to his debt. Just as the
owner himself would have held the gathered fruits free from the
mortgage, had he granted no antichresis [sic]. The creditor in
antichresis, when he has gathered the fruits, owes his account to the
owner, and not to the inactive mortgagee.
Pickersgill, 7 La. Ann. at 314 (emphasis added).
112. Old C.C. art. 3176 provided, in pertinent part:
The creditor acquires by this contract the right of reaping the fruits or
other revenues of the immovables to him given in pledge, on condition
of deducting annually their proceeds from the interest, if any be due
him, and afterwards from the principal of his debt.
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Thus, in 1870, if one wanted to pledge rent income or crops as
security for a debt, it could be done as a “pledge,” for that word
encompassed antichresis.114 These articles remained unchanged
from 1870 until 2014. Under the 2014 amendments, antichresis has
been abolished.115
C. Sale of a Pledged Corporeal Movable
New C.C. art. 3158 permits the pledgor and pledgee of a
corporeal movable to enter into a contract allowing the pledgee to
“dispose of the thing pledged at public auction or by private
sale.”116 This is in addition to the pledgee’s right to proceed by
ordinary process, or executory process if the documents are in the
proper form.117
New C.C. art. 3158 cautions that, at the public auction or
private sale, the pledgee “shall act reasonably in disposing of the
thing and shall account to the pledgor for any proceeds of the
disposition in excess of the amount needed to satisfy the secured
obligation.”118 The Comments to this article state that the rule is
derived from Old C.C. arts. 3165 and 3172.119 There are cases
under the pre-2014 articles in which courts have carefully
scrutinized private sales of pledged items and have overturned
private sales where the pledgee did not act “fairly and in good
faith.”120

Old C.C. art. 3176 (2013) (repealed 2014) (emphasis added).
113. Old C.C. art. 3177 (2013) (repealed 2014).
114. The former Civil Code articles used the term pledge to encompass both
the pledge of corporeal movables, which it called “pawn” (Old C.C. arts. 3154–
3174), and antichresis (Old C.C. arts. 3176–3181).
115. New C.C. art. 3141 cmt. d (2015).
116. See supra Part V.A (evaluating whether any corporeal movables
currently can be pledged). Note that an agreement to dispose of the pledged item
at a public or private auction can be entered into as part of the pledge agreement;
it does not have to be an agreement entered into after the pledgor is in default.
The reason that this can be done in the pledge agreement and is not prohibited
by the Alcolea case and its progeny is that this is merely an agreement on how to
sell the collateral; it is not an agreement to give the pledgee automatic
ownership of the collateral upon default. See supra note 44; see generally
Alcolea v. Smith, 90 So. 769, 771 (1922).
117. See LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 2635 (2015).
118. New C.C. art. 3158 (2015).
119. New C.C. art. 3158 cmt. (2015).
120. See, e.g., Elmer v. Elmer, 203 So. 2d 391, 394 (La. Ct. App. 1967). The
court stated:
In our opinion the ‘sale’ of the stock for the price and in the manner
and for the purpose it was made shows a ‘dealing with the property
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Pledgees who wish to utilize a contractual right to a nonjudicial “public auction”121 or private sale under New C.C. art.
3158, however, need to take the Deficiency Judgment Act122 into
account. This is because—absent a private agreement that meets
the requirements of the statutory exceptions to a Deficiency
Judgment Act involving consumer or commercial loans123—the
“public auction” or private sale will result in the creditor not being
able to collect any deficiency if the sale proceeds do not satisfy the
obligation the pledge secures. The 2014 amendments to the Civil
Code do not contain the same rules as UCC 9, which permit a
creditor to maintain a deficiency after a private sale held in a
“commercially reasonable” manner.124
VII. THE PERMISSIBLE “NEGATIVE PLEDGE” AND A
NEW PROHIBITION
New C.C. art. 3163 changes Louisiana law. It invalidates clauses
that restrict the rights of a payment recipient to encumber the
payment obligation.125 Yet, it permits the continued enforcement of
the traditional “negative pledge.” 126
incompatible with the pledgee’s fiduciary character.’ The pretended
sale amounted to no more than an appropriation by the pledgee of the
subject of the pledge to serve his own personal ends and should be set
aside. We note parenthetically that Oscar B. Elmer not only took
possession of the pledged stock but also retained and still has in his
possession Mr. and Mrs. Joseph C. Elmer’s uncancelled note.
Id. at 397.
121. See New C.C. art. 3158 (2015).
122. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:4106–4108.3 (2006).
123. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:4108.1–4108.2 (2006).
124. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:9-607 to 10:9-616 (Supp. 2015).
Louisiana Revised Statutes section 10:9-610(b) states:
(b) Commercially reasonable disposition. Every aspect of a disposition
of collateral, including the method, manner, time, place, and other
terms, must be commercially reasonable. If commercially reasonable, a
secured party may dispose of collateral by public or private
proceedings, by one or more contracts, as a unit or in parcels, and at
any time and place and on any terms. A disclaimer or modification of
warranties in a secured party’s disposition of collateral is commercially
reasonable.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10:9-610(b) (Supp. 2015). For a more detailed
discussion of this issue, see Michael H. Rubin & Jamie Seymour, Deficiency
Judgments: A Louisiana Overview, 69 LA. L. REV. 785 (2009).
125. New C.C. art. 3163 states:
A clause in a contract restricting the pledge of the rights of a party to
payments that are or will become due under the contract, making the
pledge or its enforcement a default under the contract, or providing that
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A “negative pledge” is a contractual provision that does not
grant a creditor any security in an asset but which allows the
creditor to demand immediate repayment of a loan if one or more
described assets are encumbered by the debtor. “Negative pledges”
are routinely used in loan documentation, not only in Louisiana but
also throughout the country.127 It is one of the many non-payment
default clauses lenders use to assure that borrowers maintain
sufficient assets to repay the loan.128
Two examples based on the Comments to New C.C. art. 3163
may be helpful in explaining the distinction that the article draws
between permissible “negative pledges” and impermissible
restrictions.129

the other party is excused from performance or may terminate the
contract on account of the pledge, is without effect.
126. As stated in Comment (d) to New C.C. art. 3163, the amendment to this
article is not intended to “invalidate the arrangement commonly known as a
‘negative pledge.’” See infra note 129 (quoting article 3163 comment (d) in
full).
127. See, e.g., Carl S. Bjerre, Secured Transactions Inside Out: Negative
Pledge Covenants, Property and Perfection, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 305 (1999);
Peter F. Coogan et al., The Outer Fringes of Article 9: Subordination
Agreements, Security Interests in Money and Deposits, Negative Pledge
Clauses, and Participation Agreements, 79 HARV. L. REV. 229 (1965). The
United States Supreme Court and federal circuit courts have decided cases that
involve or refer to negative pledge provisions in contracts. See, e.g., Grupo
Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308 (1999);
Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 906 F.2d 884, 889 (2d Cir. 1990);
Atlantic Tele–Network Co. v. Pub. Servs. Comm’n of the Virgin Is., 841 F.2d
70 (3d Cir. 1988); Whitfield v. Pennington, 832 F.2d 909 (5th Cir. 1987); In re
Cont’l Res. Corp., 799 F.2d 622, 626 (10th Cir. 1986); Chase Manhattan Bank,
N.A. v. Gems-by-Gordon, Inc., 649 F.2d 710 (9th Cir. 1981). In addition, at
least one Louisiana case has used the phrase “negative pledge” in an opinion.
See McClanahan v. McClanahan, 868 So. 2d 844, 860 (La. Ct. App. 2004).
128. See, e.g., Robert M. Lloyd, Financial Covenants in Commercial Loan
Documentation: Uses and Limitations, 58 TENN. L. REV. 335 (1991). One
Louisiana federal court has enforced an arrangement similar to a negative pledge
provision when a clause in an employment contract prohibited a financial
services employee from signing certain suretyship agreements. See Flanner v.
Chase Inv. Servs., Corp., No. 3:11-0940, 2013 WL 5533569 (W.D. La. Oct. 4,
2013), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, No. 13-31132, 2015 WL 408602 (5th Cir.
Feb. 2, 2015).
129. Comment (d) to New C.C. art. 3163 states:
(d) This Article does not invalidate the arrangement commonly known
as a “negative pledge” by which an obligor agrees with one of his
creditors that he will not encumber one or more of his assets in favor of
another creditor. Thus, a lessor may validly agree with one of his
creditors that he will not pledge to another creditor his rights to rents
arising under a lease of an immovable. The reason that this Article does
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Example #1. Landlord owns immovable property leased to
Tenant. Landlord enters into a contract with Creditor that
does not grant Creditor any pledge of the rental income
arising from the property; however, Landlord agrees in the
loan documents that it will not pledge rights to the rental
income to any person or entity and, if it does so, such an
action will violate the loan agreement allowing Creditor to
declare a default and immediately demand the full amount
of the loan.
This type of clause is a “negative pledge” permitted by New
C.C. art. 3163. The reason that this provision is permitted and not
prohibited by New C.C. art. 3163 is that the provision is extraneous
to the lease, which is the contract under which payments “are or will
become due”;130 further, Creditor is not a party to the lease.
Example #2. The facts are the same as in Example #1, but
Tenant has insisted on inserting into the lease a provision
prohibiting Landlord from pledging the Tenant’s rents.
New C.C. art. 3163 prohibits the enforcement of this provision
because it is contained in the lease, which is the contract under
which the payments “are or will become due”;131 moreover, Tenant
is “a party” to the lease.132
not apply to such an agreement is that the contract restricting the pledge
is not the contract under which the pledged payments will become due.
In the example given, the payments arise under the lease between the
lessor and lessee, while the prohibition against pledging those
payments arises under the contract between the lessor and his creditor.
On the other hand, this Article invalidates a stipulation in a lease
whereby the lessor agrees with the lessee that the rents under the lease
may not be pledged to the lessor’s creditors. Such a stipulation, if it
were permitted under this Article, would in effect make the rents under
the lease insusceptible of pledge. There is no similar consequence with
a negative pledge, which is a mere contractual covenant that does not
have the effect of nullifying a pledge made in violation of its terms.
New C.C. art. 3163 cmt. d (2015).
130. New C.C. art. 3163 (2015).
131. Id.
132. New C.C. art. 3163 cmts. b, c (2015). Those Comments state:
(b) Under Article 2653 (Rev. 1993), a right cannot be assigned when
the contract from which it arises prohibits the assignment of that right.
Interpreting that Article, the Supreme Court has held that there is no
public policy precluding a clause prohibiting assignment of rights under
an insurance contract. By its terms, however, Article 2653 (Rev. 1993)
applies to sales and does not necessarily apply to a mere pledge or the
granting of a security interest. Chapter 9 of the Uniform Commercial
Code generally voids anti-assignment clauses that prohibit a security
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Another distinction between this type of prohibited clause and
a permitted “negative pledge” is that the latter does not encumber
any property and does not invalidate the pledge; it merely operates
to define a non-monetary default allowing a loan to be accelerated.
The public policy distinctions between a permitted “negative
pledge” and a clause prohibited by New C.C. art. 3163 are
understandable. Allowing enforcement of a contract by which
Tenant has sought to prohibit Landlord from pledging rent would
relieve Tenant of any rent obligation to anyone other than Landlord
and would lessen the value of the rental income stream, which is a
primary source of collateral that lenders use to secure loans on
commercial properties.133
The prohibition in New C.C. art. 3163 applies to more than just
agreements between a landlord and tenant. It applies to all payment
obligations outside the scope of UCC 9 where an obligee is
ostensibly prevented by contract from pledging the obligor’s
contractual payments to the obligee.

interest and specifically provides this rule prevails over Article 2653
(Rev. 1993). Similarly, former R.S. 9:4401(G)(4) provided that any
term in a lease was ineffective if it prohibited assignment of rent,
prohibited creation of a security right in rent or required the lessee’s
consent to the assignment or security right.
(c) This Article applies to all pledges of an obligation of a third person
to make payment, including both pledges of movables that are outside
the scope of Chapter 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code and pledges
of the lessor’s interest in the lease of an immovable and its rents. The
effect of this Article is, however, limited to the pledge of payments that
are or will become due under a contract. This Article does not apply to
the encumbrance of other rights that the pledgor may have under the
contract.
133. In commercial transactions, the rental income stream not only is the
source of income for the Landlord, it also often forms a primary security sought
by creditors who provide financing to landlords. As one law review article
states: “Rents are a significant part of the security for loans secured by incomeproducing properties such as office buildings, shopping centers, and
apartments.” Julia Patterson Forrester, Still Crazy After all These Years: The
Absolute Assignment of Rents in Mortgage Loan Transactions, 59 FLA. L. REV.
487, 487 (2007). Another law review article asserts: “An assignment of leases
and rents can serve a number of practical purposes, but its most significant
purpose is to provide a mortgage lender with the ability to collect rents that
accrue from the mortgaged real property between the mortgagor’s default and a
completed foreclosure.” R. Wilson Freyermuth, Modernizing Security in Rents:
the New Uniform Assignment of Rents Act, 71 MO. L. REV. 1, 5 (2006).
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VIII. MODIFICATIONS, TERMINATIONS, AND SUBSTITUTIONS
OF PLEDGED OBLIGATIONS
New C.C. arts. 3164 through 3167 create a series of related
principles governing the effect of an amendment, modification, or
substitution of pledged obligations. The source of these rules is
found not in prior Civil Code articles but rather in UCC 9 and in
the superseded statute134 governing the assignment of rents.135
Under the amended Civil Code articles, if a pledged obligation
is modified or terminated, or if a new obligation is substituted, then
the “agreement is effective against the pledgee without his
consent”136 if this is done prior to the obligor having been given
notice of the pledge. On the other hand, if the obligor of the
pledged obligation has been given written notice of the pledge, a
subsequent “agreement modifying or extinguishing the pledged
obligation is without effect against the pledgee unless made with his
consent.”137 The 2014 amendments also permit the pledgor and
pledgee to agree that an event of default occurs if there is a
modification, termination, or substitution of the pledged obligation.138
Although Part IX of this Rumination covers leases in more
detail, a series of examples involving modification, termination,
and substitution of a lease illustrates the rules these amended
articles articulate. Each of these examples assumes (unless
otherwise stated) that the rights of Landlord (the pledgor) in the
lease had been “fully earned.”139
Example #3: Landlord and Tenant entered into a written
lease dated February 1, 2015; the lease was properly
recorded in the parish public records. The lease is for five
years and requires monthly rental payments of $5,000.
Landlord owed Creditor $1 million on a line-of-credit loan.
To secure the loan, Landlord pledged to Creditor the
134. The pre-2014 version of the assignment of rents statute was Louisiana
Revised Statutes section 9:4401 and the rent assignment provisions moved into
the Civil Code’s pledge articles. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4401 (2009 &
Supp. 2015) (amended by Act No. 281, 2014 La. Acts). See infra Part IX.
135. See New C.C. arts. 3165–3167 (2015).
136. New C.C. art. 3164 (2015).
137. Id.
138. New C.C. art. 3166 (2015).
139. New C.C. art. 3164 (2015). The reason that the Landlord should have
“fully earned” the rights in these examples is because the modification involves
past rent that is clearly due and no question has been raised concerning whether
Tenant had a defense against Landlord’s right to the past-due rent. For a further
discussion on the “fully earned” concept, see infra Example 6.
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Landlord’s rights to collect rent under the lease. The pledge
was made March 1, 2015, and recorded in the appropriate
public records,140 but Tenant was not notified of the pledge.
It turns out that Tenant had not made any rental payments to
Landlord in February or March. On April 1, 2015, Landlord
and Tenant modified the lease. In exchange for Landlord
forgiving the two missed rental payments, the Lease was
shorted by two months.
Under C.C. art. 3164, because Tenant had not been notified of
the pledge by either Creditor or Landlord, the modification was
effective against Creditor. On the other hand, if Creditor had an
agreement with Landlord that any modification of the lease would
be an event of default, then under New C.C. art. 3166, Creditor
may declare a default in the $1 million loan the pledge secures.
Example #4. The facts are the same as in Example #3,
above, except that rather than modifying the lease on April
1, 2015, Landlord and Tenant agreed in good faith to
terminate it because Tenant was suffering cash-flow issues.
In this instance, the result is the same as in Example #3.
Because Tenant had not received notice of the pledge prior to the
termination, the termination was effective against Creditor.
Nonetheless, if Creditor had an agreement with Landlord that
termination of the lease would be an event of default, Creditor may
declare a default in the $1 million loan the pledge secures.
Example #5. The facts are the same as in Example #4,
above, except that rather than just terminating the lease on
April 1, 2015, Landlord and Tenant agreed in good faith to
cancel the five-year $5,000/month lease because not only
did Tenant have cash flow difficulties but also because
Tenant had found Retailer who agreed to sign a new lease
with Landlord on the same space, with the new lease
extending for five years for a rent of $4,800/month ($200
less per month than Tenant had agreed to pay under its
lease). On April 1, 2015, Landlord and Tenant canceled
Tenant’s lease, and Landlord and Retailer entered into the
new lease.
Under New C.C. art. 3164, the substitution of a “new
contract”141 is effective against Creditor because Tenant had not
140. See infra Part IX.B for a discussion of the differences between making a
pledge of rents effective against the lessee and effective to third parties.
141. New C.C. art. 3164 does not expressly require that the “new contract”
be between the original parties (here Landlord and Tenant). It just requires that
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been notified in writing of the Landlord’s pledge.142 The pledge
continues on the rent under the lease between Landlord and
Retailer. As in the prior examples, Creditor may declare a default
in the $1 million loan if the loan documents prevented substitution
of a new lease.
Note, however, that this example may not occur in the real
world, because typically a pledge of rents would encompass all the
rents arising from the building. In such instances, Retailer’s lease
would be subject to the pledge by contract regardless of whether
the termination of Tenant’s lease was effective against Creditor.
Example #6. The facts are the same as in Examples #3 and
#4, involving a modification or termination on April 1,
2015, of the February 1, 2015 lease between Landlord and
Tenant. In this Example #6, however, Creditor notified
Tenant in writing on March 25, 2015, of the pledge to
Creditor. Thus, Tenant had notice of the pledge prior to the
April 1, 2015 modification or termination dealt with in the
prior examples.
Under New C.C. art. 3169, the “pledge of the lessor’s rights in
the lease of an immovable and its rents” is “effective as to the
lessee from the time that he is given written notice of the
pledge.”143 Because the Landlord’s rights had been “fully
earned”144 and because Tenant had received written notice, New
C.C. art. 3164 requires that unless Creditor consents, the
modification or termination “is without effect” against Creditor.
Because Creditor had not been asked about the modification or
termination and had not consented, Creditor may seek to require
Tenant to pay Creditor $5,000/month for the full five years under
the original lease provisions.145
The rule of New C.C. art. 3164 applies only if both written
notice to Tenant had occurred and the lease obligations had “been

“[t]he parties to a contract from which a pledged obligation arises may agree to . . .
substitute a new contract.” An example of a “new contract” between only
Landlord and Tenant would be where, in exchange for forgiveness of past-due
rent, Landlord and Tenant agree that Tenant will move to new, smaller space in
Landlord’s building.
142. New C.C. art. 3169 (2015).
143. Id.
144. New C.C. art. 3164 (2015). See also supra note 139 (discussing why
Landlord’s rights are “fully earned” in cases involving past-due rent).
145. The only right Creditor has in this instance is to seek to collect the lease
payments. See infra Part IX.E. Under New C.C. art. 3174, Creditor may not
invoke judicial process “to cause the rights of the lessor to be sold.”
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fully earned by the pledgor’s performance.” It is anticipated that
there may be litigation requiring interpretation of the phrase “fully
earned.” The Comments to New C.C. art. 3164 appear to invite
courts to consider by analogy the jurisprudence dealing with
similar provisions of UCC 9.146
To illustrate the issues that may arise, assume in this Example
#6 that Creditor claims that the modification or termination had no
effect because Landlord was not in default in his obligations under
the lease with Tenant. On the other hand, assume Tenant asserts as
a defense that Landlord’s rights were not “fully earned” because
the heating and cooling equipment had failed on March 23, 2015
(two days before the notice from Creditor to Tenant was given),
because the equipment had not worked properly since then, and
because Landlord had failed to remedy the situation despite
repeated requests from Tenant. Tenant’s assertion is that, because
Landlord’s performance under its lease obligations was in default
and Landlord’s rights were “not fully earned,” the written notice
Creditor had given came too late under New C.C. art. 3164.
Tenant may not seek to have Creditor correct the heating and
cooling deficiencies because, under New C.C. art. 3167, in the
absence of Creditor’s “assumption” of these obligations in a
contract with Landlord, “the existence of a pledge does not impose
upon the pledgee [here, Creditor] liability for the pledgor’s acts or
omissions, nor does it bind the pledgee to perform the pledgor’s
obligations.”
Assume further that Creditor seeks to counter Tenant’s assertion
concerning Landlord’s failure to fully perform by pointing to a
146. New C.C. art. 3164, Comment (b), notes that its rules are derived from
provisions of Louisiana Revised Statutes sections 10:9-405(a) and 10:9-405(b).
These provisions read:
§9-405. Modification of assigned contract
(a) Effect of modification on assignee. A modification of or substitution
for an assigned contract is effective against an assignee if made in good
faith. The assignee acquires corresponding rights under the modified or
substituted contract. The assignment may provide that the modification
or substitution is a breach of contract by the assignor. This Subsection
is subject to Subsections (b) through (d).
(b) Applicability of Subsection (a). Subsection (a) applies to the extent
that:
(1) the right to payment or a part thereof under an assigned contract
has not been fully earned by performance; or
(2) the right to payment or a part thereof has been fully earned by
performance and the account debtor has not received notification of
the assignment under R.S. 10:9-406(a).
See, e.g., In Re Sycom Enter., L.P., 310 B.R. 669 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2004)
(analyzing UCC art. 9-405); cf. 9B WILLIAM D. HAWKLAND ET AL.,
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SERIES § 9-405 (2006 & Supp. 2012).
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provision in the lease purporting to obligate Tenant to pay rent every
month, regardless of Landlord’s failure to maintain the systems that
provide electricity, heating, and cooling to the premises.147
As can be seen, this may become an area where Louisiana courts
will have to adjudicate what the phrase “fully earned” means.148
Example #7. The facts are the same as in Example #6 with
one alteration. Creditor gave written notice of the pledge to
Tenant on March 25, 2015, but the failure of the heating
and cooling equipment occurred one day later, on March
26, 2015.
Now, Creditor may claim that because, at the time of the notice,
the heating and cooling equipment was working properly, Landlord’s
rights had been “fully earned” for past-due rent at the time notice to
Tenant was given. Thus, Creditor may argue that the modification or
termination was not enforceable against Creditor.149
IX. THE PLEDGE OF A LESSOR’S RIGHTS IN A LEASE OF AN
IMMOVABLE AND ITS RENTS
In connection with leases, the 2014 pledge amendments apply
only to the lease of immovables. The Louisiana Lease of Movables
Act deals with movables.150 Movables that are leased can be
encumbered by a security interest under UCC 9,151 and the rents

147. Whether such a clause would be enforceable is beyond the scope of this
Rumination. For more discussion of this issue, see Frona M. Powell,
Unconscionability in the Lease of Commercial Real Estate, 35 REAL PROP.
PROB. & TR. J. 197 (2000), and Sidney G. Saltz, Allocation of Insurable Risks in
Commercial Leases, 37 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 479 (2002).
148. It is beyond the scope of this Rumination to address whether a Landlord
has “fully earned” the right to future rents such that an amendment to a lease,
reducing future rents, would be within the scope of these new articles. This is in
contrast to the examples above, where the term of the lease is being reduced or
cancelled because of Tenant’s non-payment of past-due rent.
149. One can envision further litigation on whether the Tenant has a valid
claim that it was Landlord’s failure to properly maintain the heating and cooling
equipment prior to the March 25, 2014, notice that led to the equipment failure,
thus bolstering Tenant’s argument that Landlord’s rights to collect rent had not
been “fully earned.”
150. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:3301–9:3342 (2009 & Supp. 2015).
151. Corporeal movables that are being leased typically fit UCC 9’s
definition of “equipment” or “consumer goods.” See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
10:9-102(a)(23), (33) (2002 & Supp. 2015); see also id. § 9:3342(B) (2009)
(dealing with the relationship between the Lease of Movables Act and UCC 9).
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from such movables can be subjected to a UCC 9 security
interest.152
Prior to the 2014 amendments, a creditor who wished to obtain
security on a lease of an immovable or its rents had to use the
provisions of former Louisiana Revised Statutes section 9:4401, a
complex and much-amended provision153 entitled “conditional or
collateral assignment of leases and rents.” These statutory rules
have been moved to the Civil Code and are now dealt with by New
C.C. arts. 3168–3175 as well as by amendments to the registry
articles of the Civil Code.154
The 2014 amendments apply not only to the pledge of rents by
a lessor, but also to the pledge of rents by a sublessor.155 Although
the 2014 amendments track the former provisions of section
9:4401 in a number of respects, they change the prior law by
requiring all pledges of leases of immovables and of the rentals of
such leases to be recorded in the mortgage records.156 The
amendments change the law to permit an inferior pledgee to collect
rent without accounting to a superior pledgee.157 The amendments
prohibit a judicial sale of a pledged lease or of pledged rents.158
152. See id. § 10:9-102(a)(2) (2002 & Supp. 2015) (stating that “‘Account,’ . . .
means a right to payment of a monetary obligation, whether or not earned by
performance, (i) for property that has been or is to be sold, leased, licensed,
assigned” (emphasis added)).
153. Revised Statutes section 9:4401 (added by Act No. 321, § 1, 1980 La.
Acts 824–25, and amended by Act No. 592, § 5, 1985 La. Acts 1070–90,
effective July 13, 1985; Act No. 130, § 1, 1987 La. Acts 423, 424–25, effective
June 18, 1987; Act No. 137, § 4, 1989 La. Acts 527, 532–49, effective Sept. 1,
1989; Act No. 1079, § 3, 1990 La. Acts 2735, 2738–50, effective Sept. 1, 1990;
Act No. 1087, § 3, 1995 La. Acts 2941, 2943–54; Act No. 281, § 2, 2014 La.
Acts, effective Jan. 1, 2015).
154. See New C.C. arts. 3346, 3354–3368 (2015). A discussion of the
transitional rules concerning the pre-2014 law and the post-2014 amendments
are beyond the scope of this Rumination. The transitional rules are contained in
the newly enacted Louisiana Revised Statutes section 9:4403.
155. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4401 (2009 & Supp. 2015). As Comment (b)
to this provision states:
(b) This Section expressly provides that a pledge may be created by
either a lessor or a sublessor. In the case of a pledge created by a
sublessor, the pledge encumbers his rights under the sublease, but not
his rights under the underlying lease from his own lessor. The rights of
a lessee under a lease, as well as the rights of a sublessee under a
sublease, are not susceptible of pledge but instead are encumbered by a
mortgage.
Id. § 9:4401 cmt. b (2009 & Supp. 2015) (citations omitted).
156. New C.C. art. 3346 (2015).
157. New C.C. art. 3173 (2015).
158. New C.C. art. 3174 (2015). The Comments to New C.C. art. 3174 state
that this article is “new and has no counterpart in either the Louisiana Civil Code
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The amendments also clarify the law concerning a pledge of items
classified as “rent” under the Louisiana Mineral Code.159
A. What Can Be Pledged in a Lease of Immovables
The landlord of immovables may mortgage the immovable.160
The landlord may grant a lease of an immovable and obtain by
operation of law a lessor’s privilege161 on the property of tenants
and subtenants on the leased premises,162 as well as a limited right
to pursue these items when they have been removed from the
premises.163 The tenant may mortgage the lease.164
If a creditor, however, wants to obtain a security interest in the
landlord’s lease or in the rental stream, the only way to do so is
through a pledge.
New C.C. art. 3168 permits a landlord to pledge the entirety of
a single lease, all the leases on a specified immovable, all the rents
under one or more leases, or just some of the rents under one or
more leases. As the Comments to this article note, the “scope of
what is pledged is a matter of contract between the parties.”165

of 1870 or former R.S. 9:4401.” New C.C. art. 3174 cmt. a (2015). The 2014
amendments did not continue the language of former R.S. 9:4401(a) that a real
security right in rents becomes “absolute upon assignor’s default.” LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 9:4401 (added by Act No. 321, § 1, 1980 La. Acts 824) (repealed
2014) (emphasis added).
159. See discussion supra Part III.B.
160. Civil Code articles 3278–3298 govern conventional mortgages on
immovables.
161. Louisiana Civil Code article 2707 defines a lessor’s privilege. For more
discussion on this, see Michael H. Rubin and S. Jess Sperry, Lease Financing in
Louisiana, 59 LA. L. REV. 846, 855–61 (1999).
162. Louisiana Civil Code article 2708 governs the scope of lessor’s
privilege over property of subtenants and states that the “privilege extends to the
movables of the sublessee but only to the extent that the sublessee is indebted to
his sublessor at the time the lessor exercises his right.”
163. C.C. art. 2710 (2015).
164. Louisiana Civil Code article 3286 allows a lessee to mortgage his
“rights in a lease of an immovable with his rights in the buildings and other
constructions on the immovable.” This is sometimes referred to by the commonlaw term “leasehold mortgage.” See Carriere v. Bank of La., 702 So. 2d 648,
665–67 (La. 1996); Rubin & Sperry, supra note 161, at 862–64 (discussing the
origin of the term “leasehold”); see also LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4401 cmt. b
(2009 & Supp. 2015) (quoted in supra note 155).
165. New C.C. art. 3168 cmt. b (2015).
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B. How the Pledge Is Made Effective Between the Parties, to the
Tenant, and to Third Parties
A pledge of a lease of an immovable or its rents is made
effective only by execution of a written contract between the
pledgor and pledgee.166 An act of pledge may be a separate
document or it may be contained in a mortgage.167 An act of
pledge does not need to be witnessed or notarized, and the pledgee
does not have to sign it.168 It should be noted, however, that if an
act of pledge is not in authentic form, it is not “self-proving.”169
Many attorneys prefer to use authentic acts170 for documents that
are to be recorded in the public records.
The written contract “must state precisely the nature and
situation of the immovable and must state the amount of the
secured obligation or the maximum amount of secured obligations
that may be outstanding from time to time.”171 The Comments to
New C.C. art. 3168 note that description requirements are
“identical” to those required for describing immovables subject to
a mortgage.172
A pledge of a lease or its rents is effective against third parties
only if it is recorded in the mortgage records of the parish where
the immovable is located.173 This rule applies regardless of
whether the pledge is contained in a mortgage or a separate act of
166. New C.C. art. 3149 (2015).
167. New C.C. art. 3170 (2015).
168. See discussion supra Part V.B.
169. An act that is self-proving can be introduced into evidence without
proof that parties whose signatures appear on the document in fact are the
persons they purport to be. See, e.g., Succession of Ruppert, 602 So. 2d 157, 159
(La. Ct. App. 1992) (stating that an authentic act is “self-proving under LSAC.C. art. 1835”).
170. The requirements of an authentic act are set forth in Louisiana Civil
Code article 1833.
171. New C.C. art. 3168 (2015).
172. New C.C. art. 3168 cmt. c (2015). The description requirements for
mortgages are contained in Civil Code article 3288. C.C. art. 3288 (2015).
173. New C.C. arts. 3346, 3169–3170 (2015). Note, however, that Act 281
did not alter Louisiana Civil Code article 3347, which provides: “The effect of
recordation arises when an instrument is filed with the recorder and is unaffected
by subsequent errors or omissions of the recorder. An instrument is filed with a
recorder when he accepts it for recordation in his office.” The Louisiana
Supreme Court in Wede v. Niche Marketing USA, LLC, 52 So. 3d 60 (La. 2010),
dealt with the distinction between filing and recordation in connection with a
judicial mortgage. It appears possible that, under article 3347, if the pledge is
filed and is timely recorded, the effect of recordation may affect third parties
from the time of the filing. See, e.g., Kinnebrew v. Tri-Con Prod. Corp., 154 So.
2d 433 (La. 1963); Opelousas Fin. Co. v. Reddell, 119 So. 770 (La. 1929)
(illustrating the approach of older cases on recordation and filing).
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pledge.174 This is a change from the pre-2014-amendment law,
where acts of “assignment” of leases were recorded only in the
conveyance records, but acts of assignment of leases contained in a
mortgage were recorded only in the mortgage records.175 The 2014
amendments continue to recognize that a pledge of leases may be
contained in a mortgage.176
Regardless of whether or when the pledge is made effective
against third parties, however, a lessee is affected only from the
point of time it receives a written notice of the pledge.177
C. The Length of the Effect on Third Parties of a Pledge of Leases
or Rents
The 2014 amendments incorporated the rules of a pledge of
leases or rents into the rules concerning how long mortgages affect
third parties.178 This is appropriate, considering the fact that such
pledges are often contained in mortgages179 and because all such
pledges are now recorded in the mortgage records.180
If the act of pledge reflects that the obligation it secures is due
in less than nine years, or if it cannot be ascertained from the act of
pledge when the obligation it secures is due, the effect of
recordation continues for ten years from the date of the
document.181 If the act of pledge reflects that the obligation it
secures is due nine years or more from the date of the document,
the effect of recordation is six years from the maturity date of the
obligation.182 Acts of timely reinscription preserve the original
effective date for an additional ten years from the date of
reinscription.183
Example #8. Landlord and Tenant entered into a lease of an
immovable on June 1, 2015. On June 15, 2015, Landlord
and Creditor entered into a loan agreement; Landlord signed
a negotiable note payable in three annual installments, the
first installment due July 15, 2016, and the last installment
due July 15, 2018. On June 15, 2015, Landlord and Creditor
174. New C.C. arts. 3346, 3169–3170 (2015).
175. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4401(A)(1) (added by Act No. 321, § 1,
1980 La. Acts 824) (repealed 2014).
176. New C.C. art. 3170 (2015).
177. New C.C. art. 3169 (2015). See supra Part VIII (Example #7).
178. See New C.C. arts. 3357–3365 (2015).
179. See, e.g., C.C. art. 3170 (2015).
180. See discussion supra Part IX.B.
181. New C.C. arts. 3357–3358 (2015).
182. Id.
183. New C.C. art. 3364 (2015).
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also entered into a written act of pledge of the lease and all
rents under the lease. The act of pledge contained all the
necessary terms and conditions184 and described the note it
secured as well as the payment provisions of the note.
Creditor, however, did not record the act of pledge in the
appropriate parish mortgage records until August 1, 2015.
The result is that the pledge did not begin to affect third parties
until it was recorded on August 1, 2015.185 It will cease affecting
third parties on June 15, 2025. The reason is because the note is
due in less than nine years from its date,186 and third parties are
affected for ten years “from the date” of the contract of pledge,187
not ten years from the date of the lease, and not ten years from the
date of recordation of the act of pledge.
Even though the effect of recordation of the pledge continues
until June 15, 2025, the note itself may prescribe in 2023 (five
years from its due date)188 unless acknowledged or unless
prescription has been interrupted. A pledge may interrupt
prescription under the “constant acknowledgment rule.”189
What third parties can and cannot ascertain from the public
records is essentially the same as the rule applicable to mortgages.
Third parties cannot ascertain from the public records how much,
if anything, has been paid on the note the pledge secures and
cannot ascertain whether prescription has been interrupted190 or
whether the note has prescribed because of non-payment. Thus,
third parties examining the public records must assume the worstcase scenario, which is that the note has not prescribed.191 Under
the Louisiana public records doctrine, third parties are entitled to
rely upon the absence of a timely reinscription of the pledge.192
184. See New C.C. art. 3168 (2015).
185. See New C.C. art. 3169 (2015). But see supra note 173 (concerning the
effect on third persons of filing of the act of pledge if it is later timely recorded).
186. See New C.C. arts. 3357–3358 (2015).
187. New C.C. art. 3357 (2015).
188. C.C. art. 3498 (2015). But see infra note 194 (discussing installment
notes).
189. See discussion infra Part XI.
190. Interruption could occur by payment, by acknowledgment, or by the
constant acknowledgement rule. See infra Part XI.
191. For a series of examples of these rules involving mortgages and a
further explanation, see RUBIN, A PRÉCIS, supra note 42, at 20.2.
192. As the Louisiana Supreme Court stated in London Towne Condominium
Homeowner’s Ass’n v. London Towne Co., 939 So. 2d 1227, 1232–33 (La.
2006), “the law of registry does not create rights in a positive sense, but rather
has the negative effect of denying the effectiveness of certain rights unless they
are recorded. . . . [T]he public records doctrine allows the parties to rely on the
absence of documents in the public records . . . .” (quoting Phillips v. Parker,
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Example #9. The facts are the same as in Example #8,
except that the June 15, 2015, note is due in eleven years,
not three years, with the last installment due July 15, 2026,
and the act of pledge recites these provisions of the note.
As in Example #8, the act of pledge will affect third parties
from the date it was recorded in the parish mortgage records
(August 1, 2015)193 but now, under New C.C. art. 3358, the pledge
will continue to affect third parties until July 15, 2032, “six years
after the latest maturity date described in the instrument.”194
Example #10. The facts are the same as in Example #9,
except that on December 1, 2031, Creditor reinscribes the
act of pledge in the parish mortgage records.
Assuming that the act of reinscription contains the information
required by New C.C. art. 3362,195 the reinscription is timely
because it is made prior to July 15, 2032,196 and the effects of
recordation will continue until December 1, 2041, ten years from
the date of the timely reinscription.197
D. What Happens When a Landlord Pledges the Same Lease or
Rents to Multiple Creditors
The 2014 amendments recognize that a landlord of immovables
may pledge the same lease or rents to multiple creditors. New C.C.
art. 3173 deals with the rights of superior and inferior pledgees.
New C.C. art. 3173 “changes the law by generally permitting
an inferior pledgee to collect rent from the lessee without a duty to

483 So. 2d 972 (La. 1986); Parish Nat’l Bank v. Wilks, 923 So. 2d 8, 15 (La. Ct.
App. 2005)).
193. See supra note 173 (discussing filing and recordation).
194. New C.C. art. 3358 (2015). Although prescription might run on each
installment of a note that is not secured by a pledge, the “constant
acknowledgment” rule may keep the entire note and its unpaid installments from
prescribing. Compare the “constant acknowledgement” rule, discussed infra Part
XI, with cases involving prescription of installments on a note. See, e.g.,
Johnston v. Johnston, 568 So. 2d 567, 568 (La. Ct. App. 1990); Home Fin. Corp.
v. Fisher, 361 So. 2d 463, 465 (La. Ct. App. 1978).
195. Note that under New C.C. art. 3363, the method of reinscription under
New C.C. art 3362 is the only acceptable method of reinscription.
196. New C.C. art. 3358 (2015).
197. New C.C. art. 3364 (2015).
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account to a superior pledgee for the rent collected.”198 Analogous
rules are found in UCC 9.199
Two examples may help explain some of these new pledge
rules.200
Example #11. The facts are similar to those in Example #8,
above: June 1, 2015, lease of immovable between Landlord
and Tenant, and June 15, 2015, loan agreement between
Landlord and Creditor and act of pledge.
Unlike Example #8, however, the act of pledge between
Landlord and Creditor was recorded in the appropriate
parish mortgage records on June 15, 2015. A few weeks
later, on July 1, 2015, Landlord and Bank, a new lender,
entered into another act of pledge of the same lease, and
Bank recorded the act of pledge on that same date in the
parish mortgage records. Bank is an inferior pledgee
because the pledge to it was recorded after the recordation
of the pledge to Creditor.
In this Example #11, Creditor, the superior pledgee, did not
notify Tenant of its June 15, 2015, act of pledge. On July 2,
2015, however, the inferior pledgee, Bank, notified Tenant
of its act of pledge. Pursuant to the notification Tenant
received, Tenant sent the monthly payments for August,
September, and October 2015 to Bank as each payment
became due.
It is not until October 2015 that Creditor became aware of
Bank’s act of pledge and of Tenant’s payments to Bank.
Under New C.C. art. 3173, Bank “is not bound to account” to
Creditor for the rent collected because Creditor had not notified
Tenant of Creditor’s pledge and directed Tenant to make payment
to Creditor. Thus, Bank is not liable to Creditor to repay any of the
amounts Bank collected from Tenant. This is a change in the prior
law.201
198. New C.C. art. 3173 cmt. a (2015).
199. New C.C. art. 3173 cmt. c (2015).
200. These examples do not cover the provisions of New C.C. art. 3173
dealing with “written directions given to the lessee to pay rent to the holder of
the superior pledge” or the obligations of an inferior pledgee who collects rent
after the extinguishment of all secured obligations owed to it.
201. New C.C. art. 3173, Comment (b), states in pertinent part:
(b) Former R.S. 9:4401(G)(2) provided that, if a pledgee had not
notified the lessee to make direct payment to him, the lessee was
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Moreover, if Bank had taken the rental payments and put them
in a deposit account, Creditor’s claims to such amounts would be
trumped by Bank’s rights, because in this example Bank had no
duty to account to Creditor for the monthly rent collected as it
accrued.202
Example #12. The facts are the same as in Example #11,
above, except that, on July 2, 2015, when inferior pledgee
Bank notified Tenant of its act of pledge, Bank convinced
Tenant to pre-pay the rent for August, September, and
October 2015.
Pursuant to New C.C. art. 3173, while Bank may keep the
August 2015 rent, Bank must account to Creditor (the superior
pledgee) for rent Bank “collects more than one month before it is
due.” Thus, Bank would be liable to Creditor for the pre-paid rent
for September and October.203
E. What a Pledgee of Rents or Leases May Do
A pledgee of leases or rents may give written notice to the
tenant to pay directly to the pledgee.204 There is no statutory
prohibition preventing the pledgee doing this even before the
pledgor is in default on the obligation the pledge secures, and New
C.C. art. 3160 expressly authorizes such actions. Often, creditors
like to receive and control the rent stream in what is sometimes

exonerated of liability for rent paid to the lessor or a subsequent
assignee; however, the person to whom payment was remitted was
nevertheless liable to the pledgee for the sums received. Thus, an
inferior pledgee who collected rent was exposed to liability to a
superior pledgee for any rent he might collect. This Article now permits
the inferior pledgee to retain rent he collects as it falls due, unless a
superior pledgee has notified the lessee to make payment to him and
the inferior pledgee has knowledge of these instructions.
202. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4402(C) (Supp. 2015):
Notwithstanding Subsection B of this Section, the right of a pledgee to
collections of rent deposited into a deposit account maintained by him
or for his benefit is superior to the right of another pledgee to those
collections, unless the pledgee who collected the rent has an obligation
to account for the collections to the other pledgee under Civil Code
Article 3173.
203. New C.C. art. 3173 cmt. d (2015) (“Without a rule limiting the ability of
an inferior pledgee to collect future rents, a superior pledgee might have
discovered that all future rents for the balance of the term of the lease had been
paid in advance to an inferior pledgee.”).
204. New C.C. arts. 3161, 3169 (2015).
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referred to as a “lock-box” arrangement,205 although if the “lockbox” consists of a deposit account with a financial institution, there
may be others with claims on the account.206
Merely recording an act of pledge of leases or rents in the
mortgage records, however, does not obligate the tenant to do
anything unless and until the tenant receives a written notice from
the pledgee directing the tenant to render performance to the
pledgee.
New C.C. art. 3174 prevents a pledgee from filing suit to sell
the pledged lease or rents. It prevents a judicial sale of the pledged
lease or rents. It prohibits a pledgor and pledgee from agreeing to a
judicial sale.
The only things the pledgee can do under the 2014
amendments are to (a) give notice to the tenant to make the rental
payments to the pledgee and, if tenant fails to do so, seize the rents
in the hands of the lessee;207 (b) pursue identifiable cash proceeds
205. For cases involving a creditor’s lockbox concerning rents, see In re
Castleton Plaza, LP, 707 F.3d 821, 822 (7th Cir. 2013) (“The note carries
interest of 8.37% and has several features, such as lockboxes for tenants’ rents
and approval rights for major leases, designed for additional security.”). See also
Am. Bank & Trust Co. v. Bond Int’l Ltd., 464 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1125 (N.D.
Okla. 2006) (“As part of the agreement, Bond agreed that proceeds from the
identified leases would be deposited in a bank account at American, which the
parties refer to as the ‘lockbox.’ This ensured that American could access funds
for repayment of the loan and keep track of the overall condition of Bond BVI,
Bond US, and Bond UK.”); 301 E. 69th St. Corp. v. Basser, 461 N.Y.S.2d 932,
932 (Civ. Ct. 1982) (articulating witness testimony that “he works for the
managing agent; that he maintains lease files; that he does not see rent payments
because they are mailed to a lock box; that only if there is a problem does the
rent payment go to his desk”). Cf. Jeffrey A. Usow, The Return of Seller
Financing for Commercial Real Estate?, 24 PROB. & PROP. 51, 53 (2010)
(stating that a lender “also may want to insist that all operating revenues be
placed in a lockbox subject to a deposit control agreement to give it a security
interest in the rents and profits from the property”); Donald R. Cassling,
Banking Briefs, 120 BANKING L.J. 537, 554 (2003).
206. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4402(B) (Supp. 2015).
207. New C.C. art. 3174 cmts. a–b (2015) (citations omitted) provides as
follows:
(a) This Article, which is new and has no counterpart in either the
Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 or former R.S. 9:4401, highlights a
fundamental distinction between the enforcement of the pledge of a
movable and the enforcement of the pledge of the lessor’s rights under
the lease of an immovable. In the case of the pledge of a movable,
Article 3158 (Rev. 2014) permits an extra-judicial disposition by the
pledgee, if authorized in the contract of pledge, as well as seizure and
sale by judicial process of the thing pledged. This Article precludes the
pledgee of the lessor’s rights in the lease of an immovable and its rents
from proceeding with either kind of disposition. Allowing the pledgee
to sell the lessor’s rights under the lease, whether by private or judicial
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of rent;208 and (c) demand an accounting from an inferior pledgee
who either has collected pre-paid rent or who has collected rents
with the knowledge that this payment “violated written directions
given to the lessee to pay rent to the holder of the superior
pledge.”209
F. Right of Pursuit of Identifiable Cash Proceeds of Rent
The 2014 amendments continue the prior rule permitting a
pledgee of rent of an immovable to pursue the identifiable cash
proceeds of the rental payments in the absence of an agreement to
the contrary between pledgor and pledgee.210 The term “identifiable
cash proceeds of rent”211 is more limited than the prior provisions of
old Louisiana Revised Statutes section 9:4401(F);212 however, the
phrase does encompass “money, checks, deposit accounts, or the
like.”213
If there are multiple pledges of rent, a superior pledgee may
pursue the identifiable cash proceeds that the inferior pledgee has
placed into its deposit account if the inferior pledgee has “an
obligation to account for the collections” under New C.C. art.
3173.214
sale, would, in a sense, effect an undesirable dismemberment of ownership
of the immovable.
(b) The pledge of lessor’s rights in the lease of an immovable and its
rents is enforced only by collection of rents and enforcement of other
obligations of the lessee under the lease. The pledgee is given the right
to collect rents by Article 3160 (Rev. 2014) and, to effectuate this right,
is permitted by Article 3161 (Rev. 2014) to direct the lessee to pay rent
to him. If necessary, the pledgee may enforce his rights by bringing suit
directly against the lessee. He may also employ remedies available
under the Code of Civil Procedure to seize the rents in the hands of the
lessee, but he cannot cause the lessor’s rights under the lease to be sold
by judicial process.
208. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4402 (2015); see also supra Part IX.F.
209. New C.C. art. 3173 (2015).
210. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4402 (Supp. 2015).
211. Id.
212. Id. § 9:4402 cmt. (a) (emphasis supplied).
Former R.S. 9:4401(F) provided that the assignee’s interest in leases
and rents continued in any identifiable proceeds, including
collections. Subsection A of this section limits the reach of the pledge
of a lessor’s interest in the rents of an immovable to identifiable cash
proceeds, such as money, checks, deposit accounts, or the like.
Id.
213. Id. § 9:4402(A).
214. Id. § 9:4402(C) (quoted in full at supra note 202). See also supra Part
IX.D (concerning multiple pledges).
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New Louisiana Revised Statutes section 9:4402(b) also
clarifies the respective rights of the pledgee and the depositary
institution into which the identifiable proceeds are placed.215
X. CLARIFICATION OF RULES INVOLVING JUDICIAL MORTGAGES
Act 281 of 2014 adds a Comment to Civil Code article 3359
without altering the text of this article, which deals with the
duration of a judicial mortgage.216 Act 281 also amends Civil Code
article 3368 concerning cancellation of a prescribed judicial
mortgage.
A. The Comments Added to C.C. arts. 3359 and 3364
When C.C. arts. 3359 and 3364 were added in 2005,217 there
were no corresponding Louisiana State Law Institute Comments;
however, this was because the 2005 revisions were “part of a larger
legislative reworking of the law of registry,”218 and the Louisiana
Supreme Court has looked to the Louisiana State Law Institute
Comments from 1992, when the registry articles previously had
been reworked,219 in connection with interpreting the 2005
revisions.220
C.C. art. 3359 provides that the “effect of recordation of a
judgment creating a judicial mortgage ceases ten years after the
215. Id. § 9:4402 cmt. (B):
When proceeds of rent are deposited into a deposit account maintained
with a financial institution, Subsection B provides that the rights of the
pledgee are subject to the rights of the depository bank, the rights of a
secured party who holds a security interest perfected by control of the
deposit account, and the rights of a transferee of funds from the deposit
account who does not act in collusion with the pledgor in violating the
rights of the pledgee. Except as otherwise provided in Subsection C, the
rights of a pledgee to proceeds held in the deposit account are also
subject to the rights of another pledgee holding a superior pledge of the
rent. Thus, if a lessor who has granted pledges in favor of two or more
pledgees deposits rent he has collected into a deposit account, the
ranking of the rights of the competing pledgees to the deposited rent is
preserved.
216. See Act No. 281, 2014 La. Acts.
217. See Act No. 169, §1, 2005 La. Acts 1383.
218. Wede v. Niche Mktg. USA, LLC, 52 So. 3d 60, 66 (La. 2010).
219. See Act No. 1132, §1, 1992 La. Acts 3123.
220. Wede, 52 So. 2d at 66:
Thus, because the legislature left intact Article 3320 and the principles
espoused in these revision comments when recently revising the law of
recordation, we are bound to continue to recognize these principles.
Id.
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date of the judgment.” Civil Code article 3364 states that “a notice
of reinscription that is recorded before the effect of recordation
ceases continues that effect for ten years from the date the notice is
recorded.”
Act 281 added Comments to both C.C. arts. 3359 and 3364 but
did not change the text of the articles. The new Comments221 point
out that if a judgment is not timely revived,222 the judgment
prescribes and becomes unenforceable. Thus, judgment creditors
will want to be sure to file the revival suit timely.223
Both the 2014 Comment to C.C. art. 3359 and the Comment to
New C.C. art. 3362224 point out that the only way to reinscribe a
221. These Comments were, in part, a reworking of the 1992 comments
contained in Act No. 1132, 1992 La. Acts 3123. The 2014 Comment (b) added
to Civil Code article 3359 stated the following:
(b) The failure to reinscribe a judicial mortgage within ten years of its
date causes the effect of recordation to cease. As the courts have
observed, there is a common misunderstanding as to the relationship
between reinscribing a judicial mortgage and obtaining a judgment of
revival under C.C.P. Art. 3334. Under Article 3300 (Rev. 2014), a
judicial mortgage is created by the filing of a money judgment in the
mortgage records. This Article provides that the effect of recordation of
a judgment creating a judicial mortgage ceases ten years after the date
of the judgment. A notice of reinscription filed in accordance with
Article 3362 (Rev. 2014) continues the effect of recordation of a
judicial mortgage, without the necessity of filing a judgment reviving
the original judgment. The judgment itself prescribes, however, if a suit
to revive it is not filed within ten years of its date and a judgment
reviving it obtained in due course. If the judicial mortgage is not
reinscribed, the effect of recordation ceases whether or not prescription
on the underlying judgment is interrupted by a suit for revival. If the
judicial mortgage is reinscribed, it nevertheless becomes unenforceable
when the underlying judgment prescribes. Accordingly, Article 3368
(Rev. 2014) permits the recorder to cancel the inscription from his
records upon the request of any person if the request is accompanied by
a certificate from the clerk of the court rendering the judgment that no
suit has been filed for its revival within the time required by Article
3501 (Rev. 1983) or is accompanied by a final and definitive judgment
of that court rejecting the demands of the plaintiff in a suit to revive it.
The 2014 Comment to Civil Code article 3364 states:
Under this Article, reinscription is effective when a notice of reinscription
is filed. The effect of the original recordation is extended ten years from
that time.
222. A money judgment prescribes “ten years from the time the judgment
becomes final.” C.C. art. 3501 (2015).
223. A “filing of the motion to revive interrupts the prescriptive period
applicable to the judgment.” LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 2031(a) (2015).
224. The comment to New C.C. art. 3362 states:
The method of reinscription provided for in this Article, which has
been the exclusive means of reinscription since January 1, 1993, is
much simpler than the method that was previously required.
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judgment and continue its effect for an additional ten years is via
an act of reinscription filed in the mortgage records. Filing the
revival judgment in the mortgage records may not suffice to allow
the judicial mortgage to continue to affect third parties and to
maintain its original ranking date from the time it was first
inscribed in the parish mortgage records.
B. The Change in New C.C. art. 3368 Concerning Cancellation of
Judicial Mortgages
The 2014 amendments to New C.C. art. 3368 are designed to
allow for the cancellation of the inscription of a judicial mortgage.
A judicial mortgage may be cancelled if a revival suit has not been
timely instituted, even if a timely act of reinscription has been
filed. As the Comment to New C.C. art. 3368 notes, “reinscription
of a judicial mortgage and revival of the underlying judgment are
entirely different concepts.”225 The suit for revival must be filed
within ten years from the date “the judgment becomes final.”226
Even though, under New C.C. art. 3368,227 a reinscribed
judicial mortgage cannot be cancelled without a “certificate from
New C.C. art. 3362 cmt. (2015).
225. The entire comment to the New C.C. art. 3368 states:
As Comment (b) to Article 3359 (Rev. 2014) explains, reinscription of
a judicial mortgage and revival of the underlying judgment are entirely
different concepts. Both timely reinscription and a timely suit for
revival are necessary for a judicial mortgage to continue to have effect.
Under this Article, even if a judicial mortgage is reinscribed, the
recorder must cancel the inscription of the judicial mortgage from his
records upon any person’s request accompanied by a certificate from
the clerk of the court rendering the underlying judgment that no suit
was filed for its revival within the time required by Article 3501 (Rev.
1983) or by a final and definitive judgment of that court rejecting the
demands of the plaintiff in a suit to revive it.
New C.C. art. 3368 cmt. (2015).
226. C.C. art. 3501 (2015).
227. The amendments to Civil Code article 3368 are as follows, with deleted
text shown with bracketed strike-throughs:
Notwithstanding the reinscription of a judicial mortgage created by the
filing of a judgment of a court of this state, [The] the recorder shall
cancel the judicial mortgage [a judicial mortgage created by the filing
of a judgment of a court of this state that has been reinscribed] from his
records upon [the written request] any person's written request to which
is attached a certificate from the clerk of the court rendering the
judgment that no suit or motion [has been] was filed for its revival
within the time required by Article 3501 or of a certified copy of a final
and definitive judgment of the court rejecting the demands of the
plaintiff in a suit or motion to revive the judgment.
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the clerk of the court rendering the judgment” concerning the lack
of a timely revival suit, cautious creditors also may consider filing
a notice of lis pendens in every parish where the judicial mortgage
had been recorded to show that the revival suit was timely228
Prior to 2005, a Louisiana statute provided that if the revival
suit was timely and if the judgment creditor filed a notice of lis
pendens, the judgment creditor then had up to three years to get the
new revival judgment.229 That statute was repealed in 2005.230
Thus it appears that as long as the revival suit is filed timely,231
there apparently is no statutory limit (other than the abandonment
rules)232 on obtaining the revival judgment.
XI. THE CONSTANT ACKNOWLEDGMENT RULE
The 2014 amendments make no mention of the constant
acknowledgment rule—the Louisiana doctrine holding that a
pledge constantly interrupts prescription on the principal obligation
it secures, which results in the principal obligation never prescribing
as long as the pledge exists.233 The constant acknowledgement rule

Act No. 281, 2014 La. Acts.
228. Usually, revival judgments occur quickly because they are brought ex
parte and “[n]o citation or service of process of the motion to revive shall be
required.” LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 2031 (2015).
229. The prior, now-repealed process under former Revised Statutes section
9:5502 was described in an earlier article. See Michael H. Rubin & R. Marshall
Grodner, Recent Developments in Security Devices, 53 LA. L. REV. 969, 1008
(1993) (“A judgment prescribes ten years from its date. An action to revive the
judgment must be begun prior to the expiration of the ten years. If the action to
revive the judgment is brought timely, and if a notice of lis pendens is timely
filed, then the judgment creditor has three years in which to obtain a new
judgment reviving the older one; upon the timely recordation of the new
judgment within the ten year period, the original judgment is reinscribed for an
additional ten years from the date of the timely lis pendens notice.”).
230. See Act No. 169, §8, 2005 La. Acts 1383 (repealing former Louisiana
Revised Statutes section 9:5502).
231. See LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 2031 (2015) (noting that a timely suit
interrupts prescription on the original judgment).
232. See LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 561 (2015). For a case applying the
abandonment rules to a suit to revive a judgment, see Evans v. Hamner, 24 So.
2d 814 (La. 1946). See also Goldsby v. Dr. R.E. Goldsby, Ltd., 2010-1218, 2011
WL 3806281, at *3 (La. Ct. App. Aug. 9, 2011) (citing Evans stating, “[b]ecause
the lawsuit to revive the money judgment was abandoned, the interruption of La.
C.C. art. 3501’s ten-year prescriptive period by the timely filing of the lawsuit to
revive the judgment is considered to never have occurred.”).
233. See generally Succession of Picard, 115 So. 2d 817 (La. 1959); Scott v.
Corkern, 91 So. 2d 569 (La. 1956). For more discussion on the constant
acknowledgement rule, see RUBIN, A PRÉCIS, supra note 42, at 13.5–13.6.
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has been applied in the context of collateral mortgages both before
and after the 1990 adoption of UCC 9,234 and because the 2014
amendments are silent on this, it must be assumed that the 2014
amendments make no change in the law concerning constant
acknowledgment for any item that can be pledged via delivery.
CONCLUSION
The extensive changes, clarifications, and alterations made by
the 2014 amendments reflect the efforts of the Louisiana State Law
Institute both to bring the law of pledge into the 21st Century and
to take into account analogous rules under UCC 9. Counsel for
creditors, debtors, landlords, tenants, and other obligors whose
rights are subject to pledge under the 2014 amendments will
benefit from the clarity of these new rules and from the
information provided in the Law Institute’s Comments.

234. See, e.g., Kaplan v. Univ. Lake Corp., 381 So. 2d 385 (La. 1980); Gulf
Nat’l, L.L.C. v. Alfortish, Inc., 926 So. 2d 676 (La. Ct. App. 2006). But see
CadleRock Joint Ventures Co. v. J. Graves Scaffolding Co., Inc., 152 So. 3d
1079 (La. Ct. App. 2014) (relying on pre-1990 old pledge articles rather than
UCC 9 in referring to how real security in a post-1990 collateral mortgage note
is obtained). See supra note 39.

